THE MILITARY AND MODERNIZATION IN PERU AND BRAZIL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at the military establishments of Peru and Brazil with two aims in view, first to judge the extent of their 'revolutions' and second, to determine how and why they came to occur. A comparative study of the Peruvian and Brazilian military would illuminate important aspects of both. The latter entered politics in 1964 for the first time in the twentieth century and adopted conservative, suppressive and pro-US policies typical of military governments in Latin America. However, the Peruvian military initiated a wide-reaching reform and modernization programme which earned the Revolutionary Military Government a 'left wing' populist reputation.

Both military governments were moulded first, by their respective military establishments, and second, by the nature and circumstance of their interventions. The Supreme Revolutionary Command took over in 1964 when the military saw that the traditional political and economic order were being undermined. This situation also affected the military itself, which feared disunity and civil war. Having replaced the Goulart administration the Brazilian military then proceeded to restore and strengthen the status quo. This meant a re-affirmation of capitalism, 'responsible' democracy and good relations with the US.

In Peru the military intervened because the Belaúnde government had failed to fulfil its mandate to initiate change. Officers dissatisfied with the government and with the US, used the public and national uproar over the IPC Talara Agreement

as a pretext for replacing the government with a military junta capable of modernization. The RMG was able to mix together Peruvian nationalism and structural change.

The Peruvian and Brazilian military institutions also influenced their respective governments. The latter had close contacts with the US and business, and feared subversion and criticism which were denounced as Communist-inspired. The Peruvian military had much weaker contacts with the US and business, but was very anxious about domestic and national security. Partly due to its benign traditions, but mostly due to the need to undercut guerrilla support, the Peruvian military also maintained welfare programmes, etc.

Both governments were fully representative of the military establishment. Both were conservative and authoritarian, and neither would sanction spontaneity or public initiative. Control was their common feature. Nor did they reject capitalism, although both sought a greater degree of state control in the economy. Both military governments are significant not as 'revolutionary' leaders but as products of institutional evolution.

CONTENTS

PHOTOGRAPHS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

From the time the Latin American republics gained their independence in the early I9th century, the military had been typified by its conservatism and its predatory manner. How, then, was it possible for a military government to gain a reputation for left-wing reform? Previously, Latin American military governments came to be characterized by the personalism of caudillismo, [1.] political reaction and collaboration with economic elites. Military dictatorships as they were, they proclaimed a revolutionary break with the past and a friendship with the US.

However, by the early I960's, the republics were sufficiently modernized as to indicate their readiness to join the developed and democratic nations of the world. Many observers predicted that militarism in Latin America was in decline and soon to expire.[2.] The I964 coup d'etat in Brazil helped disperse this view. The displacement of President Goulart was more significant than his replacement (by the military government of General Castelo Branco) because the military had stepped beyond the moderator role it had filled in Brazilian politics since I894. Previously the military was represented by numerous maleable Presidents, especially Getúlio Vargas. After I964 the Brazilian military ruled in its own right, hoping for civilian, constitutional co-operation.

1. (See Humphreys; pp I55 in Howard (ed) I957; and Maingot; pp 66-73 in Tulchin (ed) I973)
2. (See Needler, pp 242 in Von Lazar and Kaufman; (ed) I969; Lieuwen; I96I; pp I52,I63; Alba pp I66, I80-I8I in Johnson (ed) I967; Linares Quintana WPQ; Vol 4; No 2 June I95I; pp 254)

However, it did promise new elections to be held within a few years. The policies of the Supreme Revolutionary Command (SRC) were repressive, and they strengthened the political and economic status quo. This military government was only the second in Brazilian history, but it never the less corresponded in manner with those occuring elsewhere in Latin America at the same time.[1.]

When the Peruvian military deposed President Belaúnde Terry in I968, a new military government was set up which broke with the militarism of the Peruvian and Latin American past. The Revolutionary Military Government (RMG) completely rejected civilian participation in politics and made no promise of elections. Unlike any other military government the RMG instituted a massive reform programme, expropriated US and locally owned property, and discarded old political allies. It exercised a low level of suppression which indicated a high level of public support. In taking a nationalist and populist stand on issues, the RMG gained very quickly an international reputation for being "left-wing."

This study aims first to trace the development of the military and civil-military relations in Peru and Brazil from independence to the I960's; second to describe and explain the I964 and I968 interventions, and third to analyse, compare and contrast the Brazilian and Peruvian military institutions and their respective military governments. By discussing the military governments and the military together, the writer has tried to relate the actions, policies and achievements of the governments to the military institutions

1. (See Miguens; SCID; Vol VI; No 1; I970-I97I; pp 7)

themselves. It is not the intention of this study to judge either military government a success or failure. Nor does it intend to criticize their actions and assess the consequences in anything but very general socio-economic terms. It concentrates instead on the military element of Brazilian and Peruvian politics and tries to answer the following questions: were the I964 and I968 interventions turning points in Latin American militarism? Were the military governments, especially that of Peru, truly "revolutionary" in nature, bent on radical reform and Nasserist modernization and development, or were they "revolutionary" merely by justification and rhetoric? In trying to answer these questions, the study concentrates only on the first few years of military rule. No attempt is made to relate the events in Brazil during the I960's, and those in Peru during the late I960's and early I970's with the present day.

Some precision in definition is required. The terms "military", "officer corps" and "officers" are used interchangeably because officers are the professional administrators of force which is the purpose of the military. Officers form a class and elite of their own which heads and represents the military institution.[1] Non-commissioned officers, enlisted men and non-combatant personel are not included. Although these terms will usually refer to the army, since it is the most politically significant of the services [2] they do encompass all the services of the military establishment. These are the army, navy, airforce and marine corps, but not

1. (See Huntington; I967; pp 11-18)
2. (See Corbett; I972; pp 7-8)

the national or civil guard militia and police. Where services, branches and ranks are specified, for example, colonel of army intelligence, the writer refers to them specifically to the exclusion of other services, branches and ranks.

"Revolution" in the Latin American context refers to an extra legal method of replacing one government with another, but the writer prefers the more traditional definition of

> "fundamental change in the nature of the state, the functions of government, the principles of economic production and redistribution, the relationship of the social classes particularly as regards the control of government - in a word, a significant breaking with the past."[1.]

It also infers the participation of popular forces. The above definition refers not only to the displacement of a government by military intervention but also to its replacement by a progressive military junta.

The coup d'etat (or golpe de estado) is a specific term refering to the displacement of a government by a "seizure of power within the present system."[2.] Technically it is the most efficient and most highly organized method of intervention. The coup takes place very suddenly and very quickly, frequently without bloodshed. It requires efficient, reliable troops operating in an environment free of defending and loyalist forces.[3.]

1. (Stokes; WPQ; Vol 5; No 3; September I952; pp 46I)
2. (Luttwak; I969; pp II)
3. (See also Glossary)

Three definitions cover militarism. Alfred Vagts (I937) interpretes militarism to be military domination over the civilian, an excess of military demands and the emphasis on military values, spirit, ideals and considerations. Kurt Lang (I965) defines militarism as the exaltation of the military as supreme, the encouragement of a military or militant ideology among the people and the influence on social and political life of the representatives of the military. According to the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (Vol 1, I933) it is an attitude toward public affairs which conceives of war and preparation for war as the chief components of foreign policy, and the highest form of public service.[1]. Militarism, however, should be seen in its own social context. Judged from a western, Anglo-Saxon, liberal point of view, it is a political aberration and completely undemocratic and unconstitutional in nature.

"Intervention" usually refers to the displacement of a government, and is a general term. Less noticeable and dramatic is covert military pressure on a non-military leadership. Cases abound of such pressure.[2]. In this study, intervention usually refers to direct, overt military action against an uncumbent regime, but pressure and interference will also be considered.

It is also necessary to differentiate between development and modernization. Development refers not only to the expansion of capability, (increased production from industry, mining, plantations, fishing, etc.) but also to self sustaining

1. (See Corbett; I972; pp 3) (WCSA)
2. (See Lieuwen; I964; pp 29-30; Patch; AUFS; Vol IX; No 6; September I962; pp I5; Skidmore; I967; pp I4I)

ability, efficiency, high capital investment, production diversity and industrial predominance over agriculture. Mere expansion does not automatically signify development. Modernization refers to rationalized, centralized and specialized organization, increased State investment, the participation of all, or a great majority of the people in political and social processes and a capacity to initiate and adopt change. A decline in both death and birth rates, urbanization, class mobility and changes among institutions, for example the church, unions, military, bureaucracy, etc., also signify modernization.[1].

The terms dictatorship, authoritarianism and conservatism also require elaboration. Dictatorships in Latin America are usually personalist, permanent and maybe civilian (for example Leguía and Vargas) or military (for example Odría and Perón). They exist without constitutional mandate.[2]. Authoritarianism refers to the forcing of values and lifestyles by an authority upon a powerless a nd receptive population. It is intolerant and patronist in nature. Conservatism refers to the maintainence of the status quo, and is usually religious, rural and propertied. Conservatives usually favour centralism for the maintainence of order and protection of privilege and free trade.

Professionalism in the military was characterized by technical expertise, officer corps corporateness or loyalty, and responsibility. However, defining professionalism in these terms has proved inadequate, and North (I966) has put forward more succinct details. First, a professional military

1. (See Germani; SCID; Vol V No 8; I969-I970; pp I55-I57)
2. (See Needler pp 247 in Von Lazar and Kaufman (ed) I969)

institution recognizes its duties to protect the state against foreign aggression. Second it operates within a hierachic structure in a highly disciplined manner. Third, officers receive formal training, a regular salary and are promoted according to ability and achievement.[1].

1. (See Huntington; I967; pp 7-I9; and Corbett; I972; pp 4-5)

Inherent in comparative studies is the assumption that direct relationships exist between the cases being compared so that the similarities and disimilarities will appear to reflect each other. Unfortunately it is not possible to present and compare cases in such clear, bold relief. The main reason is that the material, authors' viewpoints and their handling of material are too diverse to conform to strict comparison. For example, Thomas Skidmore (I967) and Alfred Stepan III (I97I) provide valuable work on the Brazilian military, and its role in the I964 intervention, and in that subsequent government. However, there is no work of comparable value in English on the Peruvian military, and its role in the I968 intervention, and in that subsequent government. David Chaplin (I976), EVK Fitzgerald (I976) and Abraham Lowenthal (I975) provide very useful material on the RMG itself, but not much on the Peruvian military. Unfortunately, the material available also restricts one's access to data. Military Histories, career sketches and biographies of officers, military expenditures, promotions, appointments and salaries would have been invaluable, had they been available. The shortage of material is indicated strongly in Chapter VIII; pp 120,where it has not been possible to corroborate any of the interpretations of the I962 junta and its reform programme.

An additional factor affecting comparison is that the dramatic and far-reaching aspect of modernization and reform in Peru are more significant to the political historian than are the economic data relating to economic development. Never-the-less, the use, presentation and interpretation of material in this study are the sole responsibility of the writer who apologises for undue or uneven emphases.

Chapter II traces the development of the Latin American military and its civil-military relations from independence to the I960's. It provides a background for the presentation of the Peruvian and Brazilian cases. Chapter III describes the Brazilian military up to the March I964 intervention which is analysed in Chapter IV. The following chapter concentrates on the subsequent Supreme Revolutionary Commands of Generals Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva up to the promulgation of the fifth Institutional Act of December I968. The Peruvian case begins with Chapter VI with a description of the military up to the mid - I960's. Interpretations of the October I968 intervention are given in Chapter VII, and Chapter VIII looks at the Revolutionary Military Government of General Velasco Alvarado. The study ends with an attempt to compare the two military governments as progenies of their respective military institutions.

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CHAPTER II

THE MILITARY AND MILITARISM IN LATIN AMERICA.

The military establishments of Spanish America were instituted in I760 when Carlos III of Spain authorized the setting up in the colonies of an indigenous militia. The rule which restricted all responsible offices to peninsulares (Spaniards born in Spain) was waived so that colonial-born Spaniards could hold commissioned rank in the new militia.[1]. This rank remained the sole preserve of the white, upper class creole elite beaause non-whites of Latin American society were specifically excluded.

The militias were generally poorly organized, and their institutional authority was weak.[2]. They were not strong enough to maintain order, so that violence and force went largely unchecked in the colonies. By granting the creole officers certain privileges for example, exempting them from the jurisdiction of civil courts, Spain created in the colonies a new military class which considered itself above the law and not responsible or liable to civil authority. The militias were microcosims of hierarchic colonial society since the lower ranks were filled with mestizos, mulatos and Indians.[3].

The revolutionary armies which fought for independence were led by educated men of wealthy creole families. These men were liberal, idealist and patriotic, but of the Great Liberators - Bolívar, Sucre, O'Higgins and San Martín, only the latter was a fully trained professional soldier. The remainder were "philosophers in uniform."[4]. The armies

1. (See Carr; I975; pp 65; Lieuwen; I96I; pp I8)
2. (Johnson; I974; pp I9-20)
3. (See Calleja; pp 43-46; in Tulchin (ed) I973)
4. (Johnson; I974; pp 23)

raised by the revolutionary governments were composed of royalist militias turned republican, peasants, and liberated slaves. They lacked discipline, organization and equipment. Institutional cohesion and expertise were low. Officers were usually promoted on the battlefield. Personalist leadership and patriotic zeal compensated for grave institutional deficiencies.

After the collapse of Spanish rule in the I820's, the new republics had to decide on the most suitable means of defending themselves against reconquest. In I823, with Bolívar's encouragement, Peru formally decided on a permanent standing army, instead of a citizen-soldier militia mobilized only when needed. Most of the other republics followed the Peruvian example.[1] The republics thus prefered to keep their makeshift armies and they continued to pay them and offer officers land and promotions. Because the republics feared reconquest by Spain they were most reluctant to reduce military strength, and retire under-employed and unreliable officers.

Four factors led to the rise of militarism in the new republics. First, the bond between the State and the army was weak because units usually owed their loyalty to their leaders and regions of recruitment. Army subordination and loyalty to the State existed in practice only when the Great Liberators were Presidents. When the Liberator-Presidents departed, State control of the army was w eakened. It was further weakened by soldiers' dislike, even hatred of civilians and politicians. They had little respect for constitutionalists who broke promises about pay, and who did little or nothing to help the

1. (Johnson; I974; pp 33)

army fight for independence. The intellectuals-turned-soldiers, once progressive and liberal, now became disillusioned, reactionary and predatory.

Second the republican armies lacked institutional unity and cohesion. Regionalism divided units against each other, and leaders like Rosas in Argentina, Santa Ana in Mexico and Santa Cruz in Bolivia used their military power for personal and predatory reasons, protecting their rank, prestige and power against State attempts to reduce or control them.[1]. The "revolutions" made by this predatory military caste were merely palace revolts by a few officers.

Third republican governments were very weak in the post-independence period. Communications had collapsed, treasuries were empty, violence was widespread and central authority usually non-existent in the periphery. Often the armies were the only organized bodies in the latin American continent, and central governments often had to rely on the military to exercise some authority.

Fourth the republican armies faced strong military competition from the private armies of <u>hacendados</u> and <u>caudillos</u>. Some private armies were strong enough to defeat the State army and overthrow the government. After mid-century, when the economic power of the State had grown, it was possible to modernize and strengthen the national republic armies so that the weaker, less well equipped private armies were no longer able to challenge or threaten them.

After the I850's there was a decline in militarism and a return to political stability, but this was not due entirely to the predominance of State military power over civilian rivals, or of improved military discipline. During the

1. (See Lieuwen; I96I; pp I9-22, Johnson; I974; pp 49-50,52)

mid-century period, the politically important military and economically important rural landed elite both recognised an affinity of interest. Both were conservative, elitist and self preserving. Both relied on a personalist ideology and leadership.[1]. The oligarchy's export earnings paid military salaries and pensions, and made possible the purchase abroad of arms, ammunition and equipment. The military provided the stability and order the oligarchy needed to run their plantations and mines efficiently easily and profitably. Together the military and oligarchy eliminated or suppressed political and social rivals, thus preserving their own monopolies and interests. The common interests and interdependence of each institution would last almost a century. A series of conservative and military governments ensured free trade, institutional autonomy and public order. Few Liberal governments were able to impose duties on imports, stimulate local industry or reduce military autonomy.

Although militarism had declined after I850 its future occurance was greatly influenced by developments taking place in the military, after I880 when it was modernized, retrained, re-equiped and professionalized. There was a vast expansion of military power and technical capability. Navies were created, military academies built, entrance qualifications raised and foreign missions hired. Truly national, regular armies emerged in the I880's in Chile, Peru, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. United and cohesive, these new armies were less prone to political and regionalist influences. Professionalization and officer corps efficiency coincided with job

1. (See Stokes; WPQ; Vol 5 No 3 September I952; pp 448)

security, regular pay, promotion by merit, bureaucratic organization, discipline and retirement pensions. These reduced the susceptability of individual units to partisan influence at a time when new urban groups began to challenge the old traditional elites.

Modernization and professionalization of the military was stimulated by concern about territorial and frontier security. Because each republic depended on extractive industries (coffee, sugar, cotton plantations, beef, and nitrate and mineral mining) for its wealth it was vital that such wealth was protected against greedy neighbours. Even barren territories needed defending since their true worth was yet unknown. This nationalism was defensive and political as well as economic in nature.[1].

Professionalization also strengthened the ideological commitment of the officer corps to support the status quo. Officers recruited prior to the professionalizing era of the I880's were conservative because of the uncertainty and insecurity of the social class, and they sided with the oligarchy against popular groups which threatened them.[2]. Officers who were recruited after professionalization began were also conservative but this was a result of institutional factors rather than social class or background reasons. They identified with their profession, their brother officers in the corps and their careers. Institutional instincts were conservative, cautious, authoritarian, and elitist. Officers were concerned about defence, military strength, equipment and pay.[3] After independence, individual officers had

1. (Johnson; pp I23; in Johnson; (ed) I967)
2. (See Lieuwen; I96I; pp I9; Johnson I974; pp 52)
3. (See Huntington; I967; pp 59-79)

identified their personal career and social class interests with those of the oligarchy. After the I880's, the new professional officer identified the interests of the military institution, of which he was part, with the government and State. These interests were order, respect for law, authority and private property, and security.

Neither the military, nor the oligarchy felt secure with liberal governments which mobilized public opinion, widened the electorate, permitted dissent and threatened both to reduce the military budget and increase customs taxes in order to finance development, services and industries. Officers were, however, becoming more sympathetic toward progressive and developmentalist civilian sectors and were more understanding of socio-economic change.[1]. That the military continued to support the oligarchy was a result of two factors.

First, the common interest and interdependence of the military and oligarchy still held them together. Neither could do without the other, and neither wanted any change in the prevailing system. Also, professionalization had yet to reduce military susceptability to patronage and favour because many pre-professional men still occupied the senior ranks.

Second, although the military was more developmentalist minded, and more tolerant than in the past, it accepted the oligarch-dominated State for lack of a constitutional or practical alternative. The oligarchy continued to dominate the State because the emerging middle sectors identified with that upper class instead of challenging it for dominance, and accepted its elitist authoritarian and repressive standards.

1. (Johnson; I974; pp 79)

The oligarchy (with its middle sector supporters) continued to enjoy the support of the military through the State and the constitution it dominated. When the middle sectors and oligarchy did part political company the military often found itself divided in a civil war.[1].

Under these political conditions, the incidence of overt militarism was comparatively low, during the last decades of the I9th century, and first decades of the 20th. There were few dramatic and brutal changes of government by military intervention. First, reformist liberal governments, which aggravated the oligarchy and military, were few. The governments which did exist usually had vested interests to guard, and were not likely to encourage popular expectations.[2].

Second, it was no longer necessary for the military to overthrow governments. By neutralizing challenges to the incumbent regime by anticipatory revolt, the military allowed governments to stay in office. (continuismo)[3]. The conservative, oligarch-dominated governments possessed control of the military through its adherence to the constitution. Strike-breaking, evicting squatters and quelling peasant uprisings were carried out by the military under the legal pretense of "maintaining order."

The depression of the thirties caused a sudden increase in the incidence of military intervention in Latin America. It shattered their dependent economies and exasperated their social problems.[4] The military remained dependent on imports

1. (See Nun; I969; pp 24-26, 26-28)
2. (See also Nun; I969; pp 2I)
3. (See Kling; WPQ: Vol 9 No. I; March I956; pp 24)
4. (See Needler; pp 233; 245 in Von Lazar & Kaufman; (ed) I969; Alba; pp I73 in Johnson (ed) I967.)

of equipment, arms and ammunition, and its pay and privileges came out of export earnings which were declining. It was unwilling to reduce expenditure in line with a common natural retrenchment policy. Apart from the danger of reduced salaries, pensions and armament expenditure, officers were also concerned about discipline which could fail if enlisted men became disgruntled about reduced pay and worsening conditions.

The new interventionism was more than the military reacting to economic uncertainty. It remained as always a conservative institution which disliked change and prefered instead a predictable, controllable and patient society. Representatives of a highly organized and disciplined profession, officers were confident of their power, judgment and administrative ability. Leading a martinet and honourable existence amid civilian corruption, disorder and economic inefficency, military men felt that they were equipped and morally bound to intervene in politics in order to apply their strengths to save the situation.[1] Officers felt a strong sense of obligation.

Influencing the military and contributing to the sense of national obligation was European Fascism which emphasised nationalism, militarism, uniformity and strong dictatorial leadership. Fascism also de-emphasised compromise and political bargaining. The feeling that the military had a duty to intervene, to be policeman in power giving orders instead of receiving them from selfish incompetent politicians was nurtured throughout the I930's by Italian,

1. (Fitzgibbon; JIAS Vol XII No 2 April I970; pp I92; Stepan; I97I; pp 90; Welch & Smith; I974; pp I2,26)

German and Spanish political agencies and military missions.

Related to the institutional factor wa s the growing social and political unrest which threatened the military's monopoly on force. As the economic situation worsened, social groups, which had benefitted marginally from growth and development (for example, labour, peasantry, urban middle sectors) found themselves in dire straights. They began to make virtually impossible demands on the State and political system for equal rights, protection and employment. Disgruntled people influenced by Bolshevism, Fascism and nationalism formed themselves into numerous extremist groups which proceeded to arm themselves. The discontents, frustra tions and emotionalism fueled in Chile the White Guard and the Red Militia, and in Mexico, the Labour Militia and Gold Shirts. Peru was troubled by APRA, and Brazil by the Prestes Columnists and Integralistas. These groups fought each other, and the military. Officers feared that if these armed groups successfully challenged the military's monopoly on violence, they might try to integrate with the military, or disband it because of its identification with the status quo. Officers also feared that institutional solidarity and discipline were being undermined since some civilian groups were gaining the support of junior officers and enlisted men.

Interventionism in the I930's was also encouraged by politicians who wanted military support either to gain power for themselves or to force upon the waivering State system some military decisiveness and determination.

The frequency and success of intervention after I930 indicated a high degree of military unity, discipline, organization and consensus. Conspirators could now trust the reliability of military commanders and units, so that it was

possible to employ the more sophisticated coup d'etat method of displacing the government. The quality of the military institution, greatly improved since the I880's made possible forms of intervention which were less dangerous and more decisive than the civil wars and putsch of old.[1] Counter-revolts were not uncommon, but they indicated the break down of military unity and resolve after, not during, the initial intervention.

Another feature of military sophistication was the junta of three or four ranking officers representing each service in the military government. The junta was indicative of the decline of personalism and individualism, and the growth of esprit de corps in the officer corps.[2] The junta military government which became quite common after the I930's was an important by-product of institutionalization. Consensus in government was vital for unity and decision making. There was a "care-taker" connotation to the junta since it was a distinctly milita ry not personalist government reacting to military not personalist anxieties. After ruling for a time by decree, the junta was able to terminate itself by holding elections or appointing a successor.

The junta, comprised of several officers, and responsible to the military establishment was able to discipline itself and thus ignore the evil, corrupt brandishments of civilian politicians, bureaucrats and lobby-ists.

Most military governments up to I945 acted in defence of order and status quo against mass unrest and poor civilian government. However, there were also military governments

1. (See below in Glossary. Luttwak; I969; pp 24-27)
2. (Johnson; I974; pp II4)

which acted against the status quo and instituted reforms in Chile, Bolivia, Cuba, Guatemala, Argentina and Colombia. In the cases of Vargas in Brazil (I930-I945), Velasco Ibara in Ecuador (I944-I947) and Betancourt and Gallegos in Venezuela (I945-I948) military men participated in coups or sustained reforming civilian governments.[1] These governments, whether military or military-supported civilian governments appealed to the masses for support, granted reforms, and in passing new labour and social regulations, extended the power of the State.[2] Interested in industrialization and economic modernization, military men in power promised economic-nationalist measures and control of landlords.

A major contributing factor to this new militarism was the social class diversity of the officer corps. More officers were coming from the lower social sectors and were mestizo, mulatto and even cholo.[3] The expansion of education for lower classes greatly facilitated their entry into, and progress in the officer corps.[4] Many reached middle "jefe" rank (major and colonel rank)[5] during the I940's and were concentrated in the army. They were very aware of their national identity, having studied with foreign officers or at foreign missions. Their nationalism sometimes made them super-patriots.[6] They were also awar e of popular feeling and demand for change.

The unity and discipline of the professional military also made it possible for individuals to dominate a nation for

1. (Lieuwen; I96I; pp I29)
2. (See Johnson; I974; pp 97)
3. (See below; Glossary)
4. (Johnson; I974; pp I06)
5. (Corbett; I972; pp I2)
6. (See Johnson; I974; pp 67, I08, II2, I4I)

a short time. To prolong the hold on power, the military lea ders usually tried to reduce their political reliance on the military and gain the allegiance of civilian groups. They appealed directly to the masses and called themselves "saviours." They announced a plebian dictatorship, promised new dignity for the workers and appealed to popular xenophobia. They were the new urban caudillos. They also represented a substantial cross-section of middle "jefe" rank officers.

Secret societies within the officer corps encouraged the new caudillos.[1] They included Major Ibáñez of Chile, Colonel Perón of Argentina, Colonel Franco of Paraquay, Colonel Busch and Major Villanroel of Bolivia, Colonel Arbenz of Guatemala and Major Osorio of El Salvador. However, there were many officers of senior rank, for example General Benavides of Perú who can not be excluded.[2] Unlike the old territorial caudillos, these men did not attain power on their own initiative since they had to earn the support of their officer colleagues. One officer however, could not dominate the active officer corps for long.

Military confidence to intervene was also high. Officers considered the upper classes, which dominated political power, as incompetent and ignorant.[3] The new caudillos and their brother officers were often highly trained and saw themselves as the enlightened modern generation sponsoring change. Juan Peron himself epitomized military confidence when he said that government was a battle which the military would win because only soldiers had the will, spirit and aggression necessary.[4]

1. (Grupo de Oficales Unidos GOU in Argentina, Razón de Patria in Bolivia, Por un Mañana Auspicioso and Linea Recta in Chile. See Johnson; I974; pp I25)
2. (See Lieuwen; I96I; pp I29)
3. (Maingot; pp 352-353 in Tulchin (ed) I973)
4. (Alba; pp I7I; in Johnson; (ed) I967)

Revolutionary rhetoric was an important component in intervention, especially to justify it and gather support. In post-war manifestos issued by the new government the military frequently declared either a revolutionary, or a "restorative" movement.

Fascism, and the war which destroyed it also influenced militarist officers.[1] During the war, the military had to accept the entire responsibility for internal security because political instability and the international situation made it impossible to share it.[2] In addition, the military took a greater interest in development, modernization and industrialization since they had agreed to supply the allied armies as models - models which represented modernization and industrialization.[3] Civilians recommended to the military national control of raw resources. The military looked forward to maintaining security and taking some part in national development under civilian aegis.

In the I950's, two matters impressed themselves upon military thinking. First, prolonged intervention was a failure, and a danger to the military. Military dictators like Perón, Rojas Pinilla and Odría enjoyed considerable popularity at the beginning of their rule, but they and their military supporters usually over-estimated their ability to govern their nations. Frustration, as plans fail to live up to expectation, graft, civilian manipulation of officers and the subtle craft of political influence, dealing and compromise all served to induce political fatigue among officers in government. The efficiency, incorruptability, prestige,

1. (See above; Chapter II; pp 17-18)
2. (Lambert; pp 356-357 in Tulchin (ed) I973)
3. (Nun; I969; pp 6; Johnson; pp I2I-I22 and Pye; pp 78-79 in Johnson (ed) I967)

discipline and unity on which the officers prided themselves were tarnished. The public insubordination of officers, and their complaining in public, the proliferation of cliques in the officer corps and the purging, transfering and demotion of officers are manifestations of political fatigue in the military.[1].

Experience in the 1940's and 1950's taught the military the dangers to itself of prolonged intervention. If it was to rule even for a short time, it must have popular support for intervention. If the military government lacked legitimacy, that is, if the public did not recognise its right to hold power, it had to rule against the will of the country. The military never wanted a confrontation with the people. When it became obvious that the military was "occupying" its own country, armed violence and terrorism were possible. When the military lost its prestige, and incurred widespread hate, it found withdrawal from politics very difficult and painful because civilian governments, and the enemies the military had made while in power might persecute officers or even destroy the military in order to punish or control it. Consequently when Perón, Odría, Rojas Pinilla and Pérez Jiménez brought disrepute upon the military by the inefficency, corruption, oppression and unpopularity, it removed them.

Second, military thinking became more conservative in the 1950's. Older and senior officers disliked reform and especially the nationalist and populist movements of their younger subordinate officers. The very junior officers and

1. (See De Hoyos; 1973; pp 7-36)

cadets were more interested in professionalism and their careers, and looked to the officer corps for ideological leadership. They saw in the US the epitome of civil-military relations and State control of the armed forces. However, the success of the allied war effort in World War II "proved" to officers that State control of the economy was not as successful as laissez faire economic policies as a means of mobilizing na tional wealth. This realization reduced the Officers' interest in politics. The Latin American navies and airforces were also fairly conservative in their mood and were disinclined to support reform movements. Their personel which were much more highly educated and trained were not sympathetic toward the less privileged classes. Officers of all services prefered to rely on institutional obligations of loyalty and solidarity which were conservative values, rather than enter politics and lead popular movements which encouraged inter-service conflicts. [1]. Officers felt the natural conservatism and caution of the profession. Since they were not socialist by ideology, officers accepted the status quo and the principles of private property. Ownership and savings were vital parts of their professional status. Third, institutional control was greater than previously. Prior to the I950's the generals' institutional authority over their subordinates had been weaker than the personal and ideological authority enjoyed by jefe officers (majors and lieutenant colonels) but when institutional authority strengthened in the I950's and I960's it was no longer possible for jefe officers to run their units as private armies.

In theory, constitutionalism was the predominant military

1. (See Lieuwen; I96I; pp 66, I3I)

principle, but officers wanted a margin of autonomy from State control in order to protect their profession and their "right" to intervene. Consequently, there was written into numerous constitutions an arbiter obligation permitting the military to act in times of political crisis. This obligation was sought not only by military men, but also by civilians who wanted a check on the exercise of executive power. The military had a formalized role to play in the political process for several reasons. First, the "revolution of rising expectations", the popular demand for social economic and political justice had grown considerably in t he I950's. Officers and civilians were fearful of "levelling" movements encouraged by populist, charismatic military caudillos and by communists. The Bolivian Revolution of I952 and the rise of Castro in I959 epitomised successful "levelling" movements, emotional nationalism and expropriation of property.

Second, caudillos, Communists and populists, fully appreciating the role played by the military in defending the status quo, were likely to destroy its monopoly on force, or even replace it entirely with a militia. Officers continually feared during times of uncertainty that political rivals and revolutionaries were smuggling arms, and that a secret mass popular army was being created. The Cuban experience showed that when the smaller elitist and specialist army was being replaced, its officers were jailed, exiled, or shot.

Communism was especially anathema to the military. Its revolutionary aggressiveness conflicted with institutional caution, its disavowal of private property negated the entire socio-economic system, and its atheism struck at Roman Catholicism. Communism also conflicted with the US

position on the Cold War and since US friendship was vital for arms, ammunition, credit and security the military was not prepared to risk losing this friendship by associating with Communists in domestic or international politics. Nationalist movements were prone to weaken US ties.

Third, officers were concerned not only for institutional preservation, but also for security and unity. Internal subversion by Communists and partisan civilians of the military ranks could divide service against service, unit against unit or enlisted men against officer corps. The military wanted safeguards to prevent such subversion even if it was resting peacefully in its barracks.

Against these personal and institutional dangers, the officers reaffirmed their professional conservatism. Even progressive officers were averse to the unsettling, unpredictable affects of mass mobilization and change. The constitutional arbiter role permitted the military some political particip ation within the legal framework of the State. Since it distrusted civilians, the military reserved for itself the right to ascertain the military budget, pay, promotion and discipline. It deliberated on matters which were not always its direct concern, and in general favoured Statism and centralization of political power. Officers even considered private enterprise, the individual, and the profit motive with some distrust.[1.]

Although the military remained in its barracks in most of the republics, officers wished to play a role in national development, modernization and industrialization. Officers occupied numerous civilian government positions in welfare

1.. (See Stepan; I97I; pp 246 and Johnson; I974; pp I40)

and development projects. They often took an active part in road construction, education, housing projects and establishment of public utilities. Such work, and participation with civic action programmes greatly improved military prestige, and helped alleviate in the tangible way popular distress in the cities and countryside. Encouraging military participation in civic action was the new Kennedy Administration which hoped that military concentration on non-military projects would combat Casto-ist insurgency.[1].

The entire military establishment was becoming more aware of the need for national modernization and development, and that ultimately, military strength rested on these. This awareness was a result of improved military education, especially at senior level, and the wider range of recruitment which made the army in particular more progressive in outlook than the other armed services.

The military retained into the I960's its political autonomy. Its own officers held service minister positions in cabinet, and they were able to protect the military from abuse by oligarch-dominated governments. The state apparatus and the growth of middle sectors in the republics no longer made necessary the symbiotic military-oligarchy relationship, although the affinity of interest continued. Now the military accepted, perhaps grudgingly, any constitutional government which enjoyed public support, which acted according to law and which did not compromise military power or integrity.

1. (See Baines; JIAS Vol I4 No 4 November I972; pp 473-474, 479)

Although this background introduces in a generalized way the military and militarism of Spanish speaking Latin America, there were differences in the case of the Portuguese speaking republic of Brazil, which are made evident in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE MILITARY IN BRAZIL

Disorganization, rebellion, and violence characterized the imperial army of Brazil at independence in I822. Inefficient, it lost the Cisplatina War against Argentina in I825, and divided and disloyal it helped force the abdication of the unpopular Portuguese - born emperor Pedro I in I83I.[1.]

Despite the unreliability and indiscipline of the army, Brazil was not scarred by military interference in politics as were the Spanish-American republics. The army was just too small and too weak to dominate a vast country like Brazil, and in I832 the Regency succeeded in depriving it of its privileges and immunity from prosecution in political crimes.[2.]

Army rioting, insubordination and street fighting in Rio de Janeiro made necessary the creation of a national guard which was recruited and led by the rural fazendeiro (landowner) supporters of the government. The new guard countered the indisciplined army, but accentuated regionalism in Imperial Brazil by making central authority dependent on the good will of the provincial leadership[3.]

The Brazilian army did not perform well in either territorial wars or regional insurrections. The Paraguayan War, which began in I864 was long and costly to Brazil in men and money, despite the military heroes it produced. After the war, the army was reorganized, reformed and modernized. Military schools were updated, and provided a scientific education unavailable elsewhere in Brazil. They

1. (Worcester; I973; pp 79-8I)
2. (Johnson; I974; pp I84)
3. (See Worcester; I973; pp 88)

produced a new generation of officers who were disciplined and conservative.

A major influence on these officers was Positivism which stressed science, progress and order. The monarchy and slavery were anathema to these exponents of liberalism and republicanism. During the I870's and I880's the younger officers became disillusioned with the empire and their dislike grew for the perfidious casacas or "frock-coat" politicians. Morale suffered through reduction of budget allocation, and lack of promotion and pay increases.[1] Some officers felt that they had to save Brazil from civilians and politicians.

Reflecting the political divisions amoung civilians in the I880's, the officer corps was divided between the younger, republican and liberal officers in the army, and the conservative officers of the navy and army who were monarchists. While the older and senior officers like Field Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca and the navy admirals had considerable personal respect for the aging and infirm emperor, Pedro II, the younger and lower ranking officers in the army were critical and growing more insubordinate. In these uncertain times, a Clube Militar was founded representing a majority of the army officer corps. Initially intended to give voice to abolitionist and republican issues, the Clube became a forum for debate on political issues between army factions. It also gave minority factions a representation that made unnecessary the formation of cliques and secret societies which might endanger officer corps unity. 2.

1. (See Dudley; HAHR: Vol 55, No 1; Feb I975. pp 52-53;54; 55;56. Worcester; I973; pp II8-II9)
2. (Johnson; I974 pp 2I9-220)

The aging emperor was easily deposed in I889 by the idealist and well educated cadets and junior officers of the army. Senior, pro-monarchist officers identified more with their profession than with the empire, and rather than splitting the military and inviting civil war by defending Pedro, they led their irrepressible subordinates in a coup d'etat. Deodoro, who was a personal friend of the emperor joined the conspirators and, as head of the army, became provisional President of the new republic. While in power, he ordered a fifty percent pay rise for the military, and doubled army strength,[1] but his authority over the military was weak. In I890, Deodoro resigned in order to avert civil war, but military unity collapsed under his successor, General Floriano Peixoto. The monarchist navy attempted a counter-revolt in Rio de Janeiro harbour, and a regionalist revolt arose in Rio Grande do Sul.

Civilians were active both in supporting each revolt and in suppressing them. Floriano's military dictatorship ended in I894 when a civilian with military support was elected Brazil's first republican civilian President.

Internal security was a problem for a large undeveloped and thinly populated country. The Canudos rebellion of bandits, peasants and ex-slaves in the distant backlands of Bahia state in the I890's required strong military force and several attempts to ensure its suppression.[2] Regional revolts led by fazendeiros were also frequent occurances. In I9I0, two further backland, Canudos-style rebellions had to be suppressed by strong military forces.

Vol 55, No 1; February

1. (Dudley; HAHR:VI975; pp 56)
2. (See Bello; I966; pp I54-I55)

Most of Brazil's frontier problems were solved by diplomacy by I9I0, but the direct involvement of Brazilian troops in a dispute with Bolivia over the Acre territory(1) and public concern about US penetration of the Amazon emphasised the need for improvement in defence and security arrangements.(2) The army held maneouvres in I905 and sent some officers to Prussia for training.(3)

Military morale, however, was low. Discipline and unity were poor. The army lacked the equipment, leadership and power needed to defeat quickly and easily even the poorly equipped and irregular forces of the backlands. Inefficiency cost prestige. The crews of two battleships mutinied against the discipline and conditions and bombarded Rio de Janeiro. Germanophile officers who had studied in Germany, among them Bertholdo Klinger, were unhappy when the government employed a French military mission.(4) The Brazilian military was unable to force on the government its demands for money, privilege and equipment. Its very autonomy was threatened by the Epitacio Pessoa government in I9I9 when it broke with tradition and made a civilian instead of a soldier the new Minister of War. Despite its rejection or neglect by civilian governments, the military had a strong feeling, originating in the I9I0's that it was destined to play a major part in Brazil's future. Bertholdo Klinger, again, was representative of this mood.(5) Other officers, including the Minister of

1. (Johnson; I974; pp 200)
2. (Although she had official permission to conduct an exploratory cruise of the Amazon, USS Wilmington caused a furor among Brazilians who feared US expansion in South America. See Hill; pp 354-356 in Hill; (ed) I947)
3. (Nunn; JLAS: Vol 4 No I; I972; pp 35)
4. (Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No I; I972; pp 40)
5. (See Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No. I; I972 pp 36,42)

War himself used force and subterfuge to gain the governorships of five northern states. Officers lacking discipline and allegiance to the institution acted in political self interest. Anti-civilian feeling grew. Military revolts, including the famous Tenente revolts of I922 and I924 were crushed by loyal forces. The tenentes were junior to mid-rank officers who were modernist and progressive in their views. Their movement, tenentismo, combined socio-economic modernization, political rationalization and authoritarianism(1) Most dramatic of the revolts, illustrating the nation-wide discontent with the existing republican system was the Tenente Column of Captain Luis Carlos Prestes, which marched some 6,000 miles through Brazil in 30 months before withdrawing to Bolivia.

Military discontent was unable to affect the republic politically because the Brazilian military lacked unity, cohesive leadership and a monopoly on force. State coercive power, particularly that of the three major states, Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo and Rio Grande de Sul was great. The latter state had a militia of 20,000 men supported with tanks imported from Europe.(2) Sao Paulo hired its own French military mission and even established a State airforce. That state's militia usually outnumbered the federal troops garrisoned there by ten to one.(3) National or federal army units stationed in a state were also subordinated to the armed forces of that state,(4) for there was no central supreme command which had overall control. The states, then, held great coercive power, and immobilized both the federal government and the powerless army command.

1. (Johnson; I974; pp 203
2. (Worcester; I973; pp I66)
3. (Stepan;I97I; pp I7)
4. (Lieuwen; I96I; pp 74)

So it was that when the three states were in agreement, the military was able to overthrow the federal government of President Washington Luis and install Getúlio Vargas as provisional President in November I930. (1) Two years later in July I932, General Bertholdo Klinger led a counter-revolt of several army units and the Sao Paulo militia against Rio de Janeiro. This action failed to displace Vargas because Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais and the bulk of the military refused to support it. A civil war resulted, during which the city of Sao Paulo was bombed.

It was clear to the central, federal government of President Vargas, and the military that in the light of regional sentiment and state militia power, federal coercive power and authority had to be increased, and state autonomy reduced. A communist military revolt in Natal and Recife (two northern and isolated states) was easily crushed and gave Vargas the military and public support he needed to declare a dictatorship. (2) Two factors became evident: the weakness of officer corps unity in a vast country, and the susceptability of army ranks to communist influence.

The I937 constitution which formalized Vargas' dictatorship also abolished the independent State militias. These were absorbed into regular units, but the regional and political affiliation of the new army units was suspect. Vargas also consolidated military support behind him by purchasing defence equipment and encouraging industrialization.[3]

Brazil participated both passively and actively in

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 82)
2. (Skidmore; I967; pp 23)
3. (See Vargas speech on industry pp I30-I33 in Baily (ed) I97I and Hilton; HAHR; Vol 53 No 1 Feb I973)

Pedro II, Emperor of
Brazil, 1840 - 1889



Getulio Vargas,
President of Brazil
1930 - 1945, 1950 - 1954.

General Bertoldo Klinger



Captain Luiz Carlos Prestes

World War II. She provided raw materials and airfields for the war effort, and in anticipation of preferential treatment given to belligerent nations under Lend-Lease, Brazil also sent to Italy in I944 Fôrça Expedicionaria Brasileira (FEB). This participation had important ramifications for the future of the military, because it crystalized opinion in the officer corps on issues affecting Brazil's political, economic and foreign policies, particularly where they involved the US. Many officers, especially those who had served in Italy were subsequently very pro-US and eager to stand with US on Cold War issues. They welcomed US investment in the economy. Other officers were less trusting of US and favoured economic-nationalist and neutralist policies. Opinion differed on the best way to ensure Brazil's national security, and from what threat, international Communism or aggressive neighbours.[1]

In keeping with the democratic mood of the time, Vargas promised elections for I945, but the military feared that he might cancel them and try to remain in power. Not prepared to sanction this, the military deposed Vargas and held the elections in I946.[2] Vargas was permitted to stand for elections in I950, provided he "respected not only the Constitution, but also the unalienable right of the military."[3].

The returned President Vargas tried to gain military support but his nationalist advisers displeased the pro-US officer

1. (The Communist threat was highlighted in I946 when Prestes declared that in the event of war between Brazil and the USSR, Brazilian communists would fight for the USSR. See Skidmore; I967; pp 66. Cautious military men saw more than rhetoric in Prestes' announcement. Another matter was Argentina, a rival of long standing, which had bought large quantities of cheap, surplus war equipment from Britain while the US had been slow to provide Brazil with comparable equipment under Lend-Lease)
2. (See Worcester; I973; pp 187-189)
3. (quoted in Skidmore; I967; pp I03)

corps. The populism of Vargas and Labour Minister João Goulart also antagonised anti-communist officers. The military's position was made clear in I952 when Vargas' military supporters were defeated in elections for control of Clube Militar. Political partisans led by Carlos Lacerda asked army and airforce generals to depose Vargas. They refused but a "Colonels' Manifesto" appeared which pressured Vargas into dismissing the populist and leftist Labour Minister Goulart. (1)

When assassins who made an unsuccessful attempt to kill Lacerda were linked to the Vargas body guard the service chiefs demanded the President's resignation. They implied that Vargas himself might be innocent, but the "criminal corruption" around him compromised the presidency's "indispensible moral authority." (2) On receipt of this ultimatum on 24th August I954, Getulio Vargas committed suicide.

Despite their dislike of Juscelino Kubitschek's I955 running mate, Goulart, the military resisted Lacerda's attempts to encourage, threaten and shame them into cancelling the election. Many officers did favour action, but there was a sudden pre-emptive coup led by War Minister General Henrique Teixeira Lott, which immobilized the conspirators and ensured the inauguration of President Kubitschek and his vice-president. (3) In I960, the military accepted João Goulart as Jânio Quadros' vice-president, but when the President resigned suddenly in August I96I, the military took immediate steps to prevent the populist, left-leaning Goulart from gaining power. (4)

1. (Skidmore; I967; pp I30)
2. (See Skidmore; I967; pp I39-I4I)
3. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I06, II9)
4. (See Warcester; I973; pp 222 and Skidmore; I967; pp 209)

The governor of Rio Grande do Sul (and Goulart's brother-in-law) Leonel Brizola pressured General Machado Lopes, commander of the locally garrisoned III Army into declaring his support for constitutionalism and Goulart.(1) With a civil war looming, the military chiefs and Congress decided to give Goulart the Presidency, but power would rest with Congress in a parliamentary system. A plebiscite in 1965 would decide on keeping the new system or returning to executive presidential power. Goulart campaigned vigorously for full presidential powers and the advancement of the plebiscite date, which was moved forward by Congress to January 1963. The military accepted the verdict of the Brazilian people which voted five to one in favour of the Presidential system.

Violence rather than militarism typified post-independence Brazil, particularly in the imperial period. Brazil gained her independence in 1822 without a long costly and destructive struggle against Portugual, and the imperial government of Pedro I enjoyed undisputed legitimacy. Organized, and prosperous, Brazil was able to ignore and then proscribe military violence, unencumbered as she was by unemployed and embittered war heroes. British naval power and diplomacy ensured protection, and by facilitating Portuguese recognition, prevented any threat of reconquest.(2)

Political life in Imperial Brazil was stabilized by the 1824 Constitution which gave formal "o poder moderador" (moderator power) to the emperor so that he could remove and replace governments. This encouraged patience among opposition groups which did not seek military friendships and

1. (Skidmore; 1967; pp 210)
2. (See Worcester; 1973; pp 67, 71-72)

João Goulart,
President of Brazil
1961 - 1964.

Leonel Brizola,
Governor of
Rio Grande do Sul
during the political
crisis of 1961.

conspiracies. The legitimacy and unity of the empire were not questioned by the fazendeiros who owed their status as coroneles to the emperor.

Armed rebellion in Rio de Janeiro, and in the provinces were frequent, but not sufficient to affect change unless such action corresponded with the wishes of enlightened Brazilians spread throughout the empire. Such widespread feeling supported the declaration of independence in I822, the forced abdication of Pedro I in I83I, the rise to the throne of the under-age crown prince in I840, and the overthrow of Pedro II in I889. The disunity, indiscipline and unreliability of the Brazilian military prevented it from dominating or intimidating the empire. Army units in the provinces (and later in the states of the republic) had to co-operate with the local militia and coronel or risk destruction.(1) These local militias were once the body guards of fazendeiros and components of the national guard, but when they were taken over, disciplined and equipped by the States, their control fell to the governors. State politicos were able to use State coercive power in violent confrontations with other states and against the federal government. Army units in regional garrisons, often dispersed, and lacking monopoly of force (supremacy of arms and manpower) could not themselves apply pressure on state or federal government, or overthrow them unless active support was widespread. The national federal army was itself influenced by regional sentiment because units were recruited locally.(2) There existed in Brazil from colonization to the

1. (Destruction could be achieved not only by physical annihilation, but also by boycott which had the effect of a siege.)
2. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I3)

I960's not one, but several individual militaries devoid of strong, centralized and unified military control. Professionalization in the I890's and I900's did not improve this situation because the French military missions hired represented a politicalized and divided French army, and they tended to accentuate politicalization and disunity in the Brazilian.(1) These were particularly evident in the intermittant inter-service street fighting and the course of the I889-I894 military government. Only the Rio garrisons had overthrown the emperor, but many officers who were uninvolved were not enthusiastic about the republic. The I893-I894 civil war was made possible by this disunity.(2) No service or unit could enter politic unless it had the active or passive support of other services and units.

The respect for constitutionalism of individual military leaders greatly inhibited militarism in Brazil. The Duque de Caxias and Manuel Luiz Osorio were both veterans of the Paraguayan War, and later both served as military cabinet ministers. They controlled and moderated discontent within the army, and did not use their power or influence for partisan ends.(3) Deodoro da Fonseca also controlled, but only for a short time, the rising ideological and professional unrest of younger officers.

Militarism, as opposed to mere violence, occured in Brazil for the first time in I868 during the Paraguayan War, when Caxias forced the resignation of the War Minister who

1. (See Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No 1; I972; pp 4I)
2. (The counter-revolt was led by the navy which was white, upper class, conservative and monarchist in comparison to the more socially and racially diverse, liberal and republican army. See Johnson; I974; pp I92-I93 and Bello I966; pp I20)
3. (Johnson; I974; pp I86-I88. Warcester; I973; pp II9)

was a personal enemy. When Caxias resigned himself a few months later, he precipitated the collapse of the ministry in power. The politicians considered these actions to be military interference.(1)

A "military question" arose in the mid I880's when the government tried to remove from service politicalized officers. Colonel Cunha Mattos and Lt. Colonel Senna Madureirra were deeply involved in politics, but their insubordination caused a serious rift between politicians and the army over questions of honour and violation of regulations.(2)

In I889, Colonel Benjamin Constant publically attacked the government. Constant, the positivist ideologue who had inspired generations of officers was not disciplined at any time before the overthrow of the empire a mere three weeks later.(3) After Osorio died in I879, and Caxias in I880, army discontent and indiscipline were permitted to grow. Positivism the abolition of slavery and political corruption created a moralism and modernism among officers akin to fanaticism.(4) Civilians also wanted change, modernization and a break with the past, so that the I889 coup d'etat did receive wide support, active, passive and grudging.

The military stayed close to politics, protecting its political rights and manipulating the I9I0 elections to get Marshal Hermes da Fonseca the Presidency. When he proved difficult to control, the military realized that elections and soldier-Presidents were not effective methods of insulating the military from civilian attack.(5)

1. (See Worcester; I973; pp I08-I09)
2. (Worcester; I973; pp II9-I22)
3. (Nunn; JLAS: Vol 4 No 1 I972; pp 32. See also Bello; I966; pp 62)
4. (Nunn; JLAS: Vol 4 No 1 I972; pp 33. See also Worcester; I973; pp I38 on Floriano and corruption in Brazil.)
5. (See Stepan; I97I; pp 77)

Personalism played a part in Brazilian militarism. Caxias in I868 and Deodoro in I889 both took exception to public servants they disliked for personal reasons. Floriano, who most resembled the typical caudillo in his demand for power, betrayed the monarchy and Deodoro for his personal benefit.(1)

Young military men and junior officers were the progressive men of the I9I0's and I920's. They were well educated, and confident of their technical and institutional abilities. However, Brazil's assurance of territorial soverignty was a result of diplomacy, not of military force, and as future war seemed improbable, the officers felt a lack of purpose. The vast interior, which was a source of awe to civilians and officers alike beckoned the officers who saw the exploration and development of Brazil as alternatives to preparing for war. Accordingly, many officers joined the expeditions of General Rondon, exploring, mapping, contacting Indians and stringing telegraph lines. The belief became standard in the early 20th century that the military should participate in national development.(2)

National security remained a vital concern. Argentina was a rival not to be under-estimated and some of Brazil's frontiers were disputed by her neighbours. Officers were keen on greater military power, but civilians were unwilling to increase the military budget in the pacific euphoria of the post Great War period. The young, junior officers blamed the government and the political system for Brazil's lack of progress, her malaise and the undermining of military

1. (see Worcester; I973; pp I09, I25-I27)
2. (see Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No 1; I972; pp 36)

unity.(1) The Tenente revolts were symptomatic of this mood among the junior officers, and the survival of the Prestes Column against attempts to destroy it was indicative of the determination of the men involved, and of the level of civilian support for them.

A rebellious mood existed in military and civilian circles when the I930 election took place. Civil war seemed possible because Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul opposed the President-elect who hailed from São Paulo. A political assassin linked to President Washington Luiz caused military units in Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais and Paraíba to rebel against the government. Faced with the prospect of a civil war if President Luiz remained, senior officers in Rio de Janeiro deposed him and cancelled the election result.(2) Vargas was made provisional President, but he remained in power for fifteen years. The Authority, and centralization of political and military power of Estado Novo appealed to military men. When the federal government took control of the States' purchase and importation of armament, the military gained superiority (but not supremacy) in coercive power.(3) Milita ry unity and centralization of command were possible. Vargas proved responsive to military wishes and purchased the equipment it wanted.

Estado Nôvo created professional militarism and a professional officer class. Professional concepts of hierachy, authority, bureaucracy planning and centralism could be applied to national, economic, social and political matters. [4]

1. (Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No 1; I972; pp 47)
2. (Skidmore; I967; pp 5-6)
3. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I8)
4. (See Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No 1; I972; pp 50-5I)

Estado Novo was a decisive beginning. The military worked with the president (in defending Brazil) instead of having to lobby the políticos. Officers were greatly concerned about national security during the I930's and I940's. Border conflicts, the Leticia war between Peru and Colombia, (I932-I933) and the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (I932-I935) were taking place. Officers also feared that a future European war would threaten Brazil's security.[1] Fascist and communist subversion and populist politics justified authoritarianism, but the military also had to protect its unity and reputation by withstanding the lobbying subversion of perfidious civilians who sought intervention.

The military, recruited regionally and well educated also reflected the mood of society. To this extent officers considered themselves "o povo fardado" (the people in uniform). Their interests in national development and defence coincided with those of the people. Although they believed themselves non-political, officers also felt that they had a duty to purge the political system of corruption and peculation. In I945 the military was aware of the mood for democracy in Brazil, and Vargas was deposed because he did not reflect this mood. [2]

Articles I76-I78 of the I946 Constitution reserved for the military "o poder moderador" formerly held by the emperor. This reservation or obligation appeared also in the I89I, and I934 Constitutions[3]. Military intervention was a constitutional obligation. The military was expected to ensure domestic law

1. (Hilton; HAHR: Vol 53 No 1; Feb. I973; pp 73-75)
2. (See Worcester; I973; pp I86-I88. Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No I I972; pp 48)
3. (Stepan; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 73)

and order, and to accept the authority of the President only "dentro dos limites da lei" (within the limits of the law). This gave the military the right to deliberate on constitutional matters and pass judgment. It also justified civilian approaches to the military. The Brazilian public accepted this constitutional obligation and it was able to set publically the goals and limits of intervention because the military prefered to co-operate rather than compete with civilians.[1]

The military permitted Vargas to return to power in I950 when he won the Presidential election. Although his enemies including Carlos Lacerda gained some support among junior officers for a coup d'etat, Vargas was safe as long as he held senior officers' respect. Unfortunately this respect became tenuous because of the corruption and economic failure of Vargas' Presidency, which also seemed oblivious to growing social instability. Vargas lost this respect when his body guard was found implicated in the attempt on Lacerda's life. Because an airforce major died in the attempt the senior officers were unable to ignore their subordinates demands that Vargas resign.

Nor was War Minister Henrique Teixeira Lott able to ignore the junior officers who were opposed to the populist, left-wing and nationalist policies of President-elect Juscelino Kubitschek and his running mate João Goulart. The young officers also enjoyed considerable civilian support,

1. (The military did not always want this constitutional responsibility. When Rui Barbosa drew up the I89I Constitution, many officers, including Deodoro, opposed this discretionary duty because it endaggered military discipline. See Stepan; I97I; pp 76-77)

- civilians including Lacerda even approached them about a possible coup d'etat. Military discipline was about to crack but General Lott acted first, overthrowing the provisional President who was opposed to Kubitschek and surprising the conspiring officers into passivity. By Lott's action, the full prestige of the army was committed to the inauguration of Kubitschek and Goulart.[1].

When President Jânio Quadros resigned suddenly in August I96I, the three military ministers immediately declared martial law, and announced that Vice President Goulart could not resume his new duties.[2]. Many officers were opposed to this defiance of constitutionalism, but they would not disobey the military ministers' veto. In the suddenness of the crisis, the ministers neglected to seek the regional and military commanders' agreement for their action, and they were unprepared for the stand taken by General Lopes of the III Army who, pressured by Governor Brizola and his militia, declared for constitutionism and Goulart, and thus made imminent the ghastly spectre of civil war.[3]. Goulart's popular support, his constitutional right to power and imminent civil war gave heart to the constitutionalist cause. Both sides compromised: political power would rest with Congress, and Goulart would receive the ceremonial post of President. A plebiscite in I965 would decide on Brazil's constitutional

1. (It also illustrated the growing precariousness of Brazilian politics in that the constitution had to be defied by Lott in order to preserve it. Civilian and military conspirators were opposed to Kubitschek principally because Goulart, Vargas' former Labour Minister, was to be his Vice President. See Worcester; I973; pp 2I0-2I2 and Skidmore; I967; pp I54-I55)
2. (Studies do not indicate that Quadros was pressured into resigning by the military. See Stepan; I97I; pp 68 footnote)
3. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I9)

future - legislative and parliamentary, or executive and presidential. Goulart was on probation.

In the interventions of I930, I945 and I954, the Brazilian military had a mandate in public opinion to act. Officers knew exactly what they were expected to do simply by reading the newspapers. The public trusted the military not to exceed its "commands" by ruling after intervening. Despite the enthusiasm of the junior officers, the military lacked confidence in its ability to rule, and prefered civilians to replace the government it had displaced.

The attempts to exclude João Goulart from office in I955 and I96I failed because first, public support for exclusion by intervention was poor, and second the military lacked the vital pre-requisite of unity. The civil wars of I893 and I932 illustrated the dangers of military disunity. Another danger was that entire regions of Brazil could rise up in revolt and endanger revolutionary successes at the centre. [1].

Frequently, the military was encouraged to act by civilians like Lacerda, but it never did so until a consensus among officers had been reached. Discussion and decision occured at the Clube Militar, and individual senior officers were often instrumental at meetings in gaining support for a particular decision.[2]. When events moved too fast for discussion, as in I954 with General Lott's fait accompli action, and in I96I when an attempt was made to keep Goulart out of power, the military accepted a passive role rather than act and risk conflict. Under these conditions the I96I compromise

1. (See above; Chapter III; pp 31,42 ,; and Skidmore; I967 pp 5)
2. (See Skidmore; I967; pp I0I-I02

suited War Minister Odílio Denys and the other service ministers since Goulart lacked executive power, but within two years, he had regained that power in a national plebiscite.

In 1954, the military had forced President Vargas to dismiss Goulart from his cabinet. In 1955 and 1961 it was ready to keep him from office by preventive intervention. Now, in 1963 Goulart held power in his own right. Would it be necessary or possible to dismiss him again?

CHAPTER IV

THE COUP D'ETAT OF I964

President Goulart had held full executive power for only fifteen months when he was deposed by the military on 3Ist March I964. The major reasons for his removal were his poor relations with the military and its fears that its institutional integrity was being undermined.

Of great concern to the military was growing discontent of the enlisted ranks, especially among the non-commissioned officers. Since World War II there had been major improvements in the professional and educational status of non-commissioned officers because of the increased demand for specialized and technical personel in modern armed forces. Unfortunately, this improvement in status was not accompanied by a rise in political and social standing. The corporals and sergeants became resentful, discontented and consious of their political inferiority. In I96I, it was evident that a schism existed between officers and the enlisted ranks led by the sergeants.[1]

President Goulart and his brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, both sought sergeants' support in return for greater political rights, such as being able to hold public office and vote. Both of these rights were denied to enlisted men. The special housing and other benefits the sergeants received seemed to threaten the military chain-of-command. Perhaps the sergeants could be bought.

At a meeting held in May I963 in Rio de Janeiro, the non-commissioned officers decided that they would protect

1. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I58-I60)

Goulart from any attempt to overthrow him by conservatives. They also decided that they would not defend existing laws which protected the rights and privileges of a few.

In September 1963, the sergeants and enlisted men of the airforce, navy and marines mutinied in Brasília and tried to seize control of the government. The spark for the mutiny was the Supreme Court ruling upholding the denial of rights of enlisted men to hold public office. The sergeants were also influenced by radical leftist labour leaders and nationalists.[1].

President Goulart's reaction was equivocal, because by not taking action against the mutineers he created the feeling among military men that he was unreliable and encouraging indiscipline. Although Goulart had not encouraged or praised the mutineers he did not denounce them either.

Political partisanship within the military and the weakening of discipline were clearly evident when a thousand sailors and marines mutinied in Rio de Janeiro on 26th March 1964. The spark this time was the attempt by the Navy Minister, Admiral Mota, to discipline a sailor who was engaged in union activity. Again, President Goulart failed to take a clear stand against the mutineers. He dismissed Admiral Mota and consulted pro-Communist labour leaders about the choice of a replacement. The new Navy Minister, Admiral Paulo Rodrigues ordered a full amnesty for the mutineers, confirming fears throughout the entire military establishment that Goulart was deliberately undermining discipline so that military action against him would be less likely.

1. (Skidmore; 1967; pp 260-261)

At a meeting of sergeants held in Rio de Janeiro, on 30th March I964, the President confirmed military fears when he asked for the sergeants' support, and then denounced the officer-corps as disobedient because it had tried to exclude him from power in I96I.[1].

Goulart's actions accentuated divisions not only between the officer corps and the ranks, but also between officers in corps itself. As President and Chief Commander of the armed forces, Goulart was able to promote and transfer officers. General Amaury Kruel, for example, who was a personal friend of the President, was given command of the all important II Army stationed in São Paulo state. Unfortunately, the feeling spread that President Goulart was promoting and transfering officers for political or personal reasons, instead of relying on professional and military suitability. The President was thought to be abusing the system. Resentment among officers and personal anxiety over future promotion do appear to have contributed to the conspiracy.[2].

Numerous officers were conspirators of long standing, for example, Odílio Denys and Cordeiro de Farias. They had sought backing and opportunity to overthrow Goulart ever since Quadros had resigned in I96I, but of the four army commanders, only General Justino Bastos of the IV Army, stationed in the distant and isolated Northeast region, was prepared to co-operate. [3].

The conspirators then turned to the State governors for help. The state militias were often very powerful although

1. (Skidmore; I967; pp 296-297. Warcester; I973; pp 228)
2. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I66-I67)
3. (Skidmore; I967; pp 295)

lacking in heavy equipment. The São Paulo militia actually outnumbered the local II Army by two to one.[1] Obviously, individual army commander could not afford to ignore the will of the local governor for the lethal power he held could plunge the state if not the country into civil war, a possibility which still plagued the military conspirators right up to early March I964.[2] Although the State governors had the coercive power to intimidate the national military, military and militia leaders realized that a balance of power existed between them. Never-the-less, one State governor, Brizola, was able to mobilize local opinion and his militia, and force the local army commander to disobey his own superiors at Army High Command in I96I. The conspirators of I96I and I964 wanted a sharp, short surgical action, and the active or passive support of all armed organizations, especially the militias of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. If the government lacked any armed support whatsoever, the insurgent units would not meet resistance during a coup d'etat when speed and time were vital.

Unfortunately Goulart had also lost support among the State governors. Magalhães Pinto, governor of Minas Gerais was a moderate politician who was attracted to the left. He had supported Goulart in I96I in his struggle for power but by late I963 he was very concerned that the President might be engineering a revolution.[3] Pinto controlled a large state militia so that his active or passive support was vital to

1. (See Stepan; I97I; pp 200-20I)
2. (Stepan; I97I; pp I90)
3. (Stepan; I97I; pp 92)

politicians and conspirators.[1].

Governor Miguel Arraes of Pernambuco was like Pinto, a possible candidate for the I965 Presidential elections. He, too, feared that Goulart might engineer a revolution that would cancel the elections and keep himself in power. Arraes competed with Goulart for leftist support and Goulart tried to weaken the competition by appointing strong, anti-Communist generals to command the IV Army based in Arraes' state. Goulart even tried to eliminate Arraes by having him deposed from the governership of his own state in I963. Arraes had no reason to help Goulart. In fact, he even feared that he w ould "suffer" if Goulart executed a coup.[2].

Two other states were vital in power plays. Guanabara was a small state, (once a federal territory when Rio de Janeiro was the capital) but it was densely populated, and it retained its political importance as a barometer of public opinion. The state governor, Carlos Lacerda, had long been a bitter enemy of Goulart and his mentor Getúlio Vargas. As a conservative, Lacerda was vehemently opposed to labour and populist movements, and as leader of União Democratica Nacional he hoped to stand in the I965 Presidential election.[3]. There were doubts about the military significance of Guanabara where the I Army was stationed[4], but Lacerda's political and journalist skills made the State a forum for national public opinion.

Of vital military significance was São Paulo because of its 30,000 man militia which outnumbered the locally garrisoned

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 92; I89. Skidmore; I967; pp 275)
2. (Stepan; I97I; pp I93-I94. Skidmore; I967; pp 276)
3. (See Bourne; I969; pp 206-2I7; Skidmore; I967; pp 274)
4. (See Skidmore; I967; pp 275 and Stepan; I97I; pp I7,I89)

II Army.[1]. Governor Adhemar de Barros was like Lacerda, militantly anti-Goulart. Rio Grande do Sul was vital to Goulart's succession to the Presidency in I96I but the significance of the III Army and the militia was reduced when Leonel Brizola stepped down as governor in order to enter Congress in I962.

The state governors who could intimidate or neutralize the military were not the Goulart supporters that Brizola and Pinto had been in I96I. By late I963 the governors were not at all prepared to use their militia against local military units. Military men were undecided about Goulart and hoped that any coup d'etat against him would be led by a major state. Magalhães Pinto had given assurances to the local army commanders of his support during I962 and I963, and on 20th March I964 he declared on national television that Minas Gerais would resist any "revolution from above." That same evening, Adhemar de Barros also announced on television that he too was prepared to use force against the central government.[2].

Magalhães Pinto helped develop a "defensive" coup strategy in late March I964 by which Goulart would be removed by the military in accordance with their duty to protect constitutionalism. This strategy helped solidify military opinion about Goulart's overthrow because it placed the responsibility on the President and placed the military in a hapless dutiful light. The state governors, then, did not impede military action, rather they permitted and encouraged it.[3].

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 20I)
2. (Stepan; I97I; pp I99-20I)
3. (See Young; pp 455 in Burnett & Johnson; (ed) I968)

Carlos Lacerda,
Governor of Guanabara



With President Vargas (centre) is Adhemar de Barros (left) the future Governor of São Paulo.

Perhaps a relevant factor nurturing State support was that Goulart intended using the wealth of Brazil to develop backward regions. This meant that the richest states of the republic, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Guanabara would be paying for the development of Brazil. To the "revolution of rising expectations" in Brazil, there was a regional aspect: the poor, backward Northeast and South regions conflicted with the "Big Three" states. The struggle also centred around the Presidency, reformers, modernizers and leftist-labour groups on one side and Congress and centre-rightist groups on the other. Initially, the I964 intervention appeared to be a continuation of the regional struggle. Certainly, "big business" in São Paulo had contributed secretly to the coercive and financial strength of the militia in order to increase its power vis-à-vis the regular army and the central government in Brasília.[1]

Although the military and state conspirators had spent years preparing for a coup d'etat, it was only in late March I964 that support was overwhelming, and therefore, sufficient.

First, João Goulart was a weak President, too easily influenced by his rivals Leonel Brizola and Miguel Arraes, and too reliant on his advisers who included War Minister General Dantas Ribeiro, General Assis Brasil, Raul Riff and Darcy Ribeiro. Their advise was often unsound and unreliable.[2.]

Second, economic conditions were worsening. Most significant was the rising inflation rate which

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 200; Lieuwen; I964; pp 79)
2. (Dantas Ribeiro ignored the rising discontent of the army, and Assis Brasil was an alcoholic. See Skidmore; I967; pp 255, 265, 284-287)

aggravated social unrest. The budget deficit also exceeded Brazil's ability to repay.[1].

Third, as his Presidency foundered on the shoals of inflation and Congressional obstructionism, Goulart turned more toward leftists and extremists for advice. When Brizola, the dynamic, left-wing populist started organizing grupos de onze (committees of eleven) of armed men, it appeared very much as though Goulart might try to bypass state structures and rule directly through a counter-state of local councils. The Law, elections, Congress and the bureaucracy might become obselete.

While leftist influence mounted on Goulart during I963, military influence declined. The officers were gravely concerned about recent developments. Extremists were becoming more powerful. Campaigning in Lacerda's own home state of Guanabara; Brizola won a Congressional election with an unprecedent majority.[2]. In Lacerda's own state, Brizola had showed how unpredictable popular opinion had become. Rightist groups were also becoming dangerous because they were arming themselves. Strikes were prevalent in the country as well as in the towns, and there was an increasing predilliction for violence. Thesè indicated growing political and social instability, but Goulart was insensitive to this. Especially concerned about the growing coercive power of its competitors, the military convinced President Goulart that he ask Congress to declare a thirty day state-of-siege and confer on him martial law powers. This Goulart did on 4th October I963.

1. (See Worcester; I973; pp 226)
2. (See Skidmore; I967; pp 28I)

The military hoped that he would preside over an emergency regime resting primarily on the army. Hopefully, it could stop the extensive trafficking of guns in Brazil by clandestine organizations. Immediate Congressional approval of Goulart's request was necessary, but Congress procrastinated and labour leftist leaders convinced the President to withdraw his request on 7th October. Goulart had lost his nerve.[1] He had also let down the military.

Frustrated by the failing economy,[2] unable to institute reforms, and drawn more to the left, Goulart took a radical-leftist stand at a rally of I50,000 people in Rio de Janeiro on Friday, I3th March I964. Flanked by his wife, and Darcy Ribeiro, General Brasil and Leonel Brizola, President Goulart signed at the rally two decrees nationalizing private oil refineries and expropriating certain lands for redistribution. There would be further decrees, he promised, on rent control, tax reform and enfranchisement of enlisted men and illiterates.

By ignoring Congress as a law-making and deliberating body, Goulart rejected constitutional proceedure. The expropriations also rejected constitutionalism because there were insufficient funds available to pay compensation as demanded by law. The principle of private ownership was noticeably under attack. Even worse, Goulart had denounced the I946 constitution as dbselete, and had demanded its revision.[3]

The Black Friday rally galvanized políticos and military men alike. By abandoning certain constitutional obligations,

1. (Skidmore; I967; pp 26I-263; 280)
2. (See Skidmore; I967; pp 239-24I)
3. (Worcester; I973; pp 227, Skidmore; I967; pp 288, 29I)

Goulart strengthened the fears of aspiring presidential candidates that he might postpone the national elections scheduled for October 1965, or alter the electoral rules so that he or Brizola, both legally excluded from standing, might yet be able to do so.[1]. The Presidential aspirants and the governors, especially Lacerda, Magalhães Pinto, Adhemar de Barros and Miguel Arraes began to conspire against Goulart hoping that he might be removed from power like his political mentor, Vargas.

The military understood the Black Friday rally in terms of security, which was already tenuous. Because of Goulart's weak leadership and reliance on extreme leftists, and in view of Brizola's grupos de onze, it appeared quite possible to the military that Communists could take control of the populist movement President Goulart was creating. Only five years previously, Fidel Castro had risen to power and after destroying all opposition had proclaimed the Marxist-Leninist revolution.[2].

In the Black Friday rally, Goulart was identified with communist and extremist politics which conflicted with the military's anti-communism. The military could not accept expropriation without compensation whether or not it affected Brazilian or foreign owned property. To conservative, establishment - and legal - minded citizens who hoped to retire one day in security, private property was an important principle. It was also important to the US, with which the Brazilian military had, since WW II, developed strong ties. US influence on the officer corps was strong and positive.

1. (Stepan; 1971; p p 199)
2. (Stepan; 1971; pp 156-157)

Senior officers trusted the US, and considered its business interests in Brazil necessary, and no risk to security or Brazil's future.[1].

Other reasons for the officers' concern about Goulart was that his economic mismanagement would affect business and that he would cost the military many of its jobs. Large numbers of officers were employed in civilian jobs in Brazilian administration, and in communication and industrial sectors, which greatly improved their personal incomes.[2].

Military men were not impressed either by the nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric of the radicals around Goulart. The last thing officers wanted was a mobilized, volatile mob ready to attack physically anything or anybody at whim.

To gain the popular support he wanted in order to ignore with impunity the military and constitution, President Goulart had to promise or give something, and currying favour with the discontented enlisted ranks both weakened the military's capability to resist, and brought much needed support.

Distrust of Goulart was widespread, and he lost the authority and prestige he needed to govern. Although he had rejected the centre, moderate and cautious groups by aligning himself with the radical leftists and nationalists, the President gained no hard, firm decisive support. Miguel Arraes, Luis Carlos Prestes, Francisco Julião and even brother-in-law Brizola distrusted their new convert to the radical leftist cause. They feared that he might in some way compromise or undermine them.[3].

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 242-243)
2. (See Johnson; I974; pp 2II-2I2)
3. (Worcester; I973; pp 223-224; Stepan; I97I; pp I93-I94)

Moderate and centre groups which might have backed a reform programme were very worried that Goulart's electoral and land reforms would bring about dangerous social changes. Their representation would be lost if the President dispensed entirely with Congress, but it was impossible to get rid of Goulart constitutionally because there were insufficient grounds for beginning impeachment proceedings.[1].

The strength of middle class feeling was demonstrated on I9th March I964 when 500,000 people crowded the streets of São Paulo to protest the Black Friday rally of six days previously. The following day, Governors Adhemar de Barros and Magalhães Pinto made their television announcements.

An additional factor in reducing Goulart's support was the rhetoric of "resentment politics" whereby influential and important people were publically insulted by radicals like Brizola. Because he was associated with such radicals, the President lost many sympathizers and gained new enemies.[2].

Goulart's claim to obedience from the military had weakened considerably in October I963 when unsuccessful attempts were made to kidnap Governors Lacerda and Arraes. Public opinion about President Goulart was still general and amorphous when the military felt that its institution was being threatened by the pardons of the mutineers of September I963 and March I964. By late March, the officer corps was no longer worried about the mood of other power groups like business, industry and landowners.[3]. It was at this late time, only ten days before the coup d'etat that Brazil's most important power

1. (Skidmore; I967; pp 298, 302)
2. (See Stepan; I97I; pp I98)
3. (Stepan; I97I; pp I63)

group, the military, decided to represent public opinion in a power play. When it was learned that the coup being planned was merely "defensive" in nature, aimed at deposing a recalcitrant executive, many officers joined it. Among the adherents to the plan was the highly respected Chief of Staff, Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco.[1.] Even legalist officers were considering the possibilities of a coup, although only about 10% of the senior officer corps was actively and enthusiastically engaged in planning it.[2.] Few officers in key commands were ready to act.

The first major turning point in the fate of Goulart's Presidency was the Black Friday rally which cost him so much of his public respect and legal right to power. By attacking the 1946 Constitution as obselete and archaic, he weakened his claim to obedience from the military. This point was made frequently in public and in newspapers.[3.]

Military men concluded that Goulart was a threat to national security and must be removed. The President was incompetent, unable to control the economy or the rising violence. A consensus was being reached, but still moderate, legalist officers hesitated.

On 20th March 1964, when Adhemar de Barros and Magalhães Pinto made their television speeches, Marshal Castelo Branco circulated among officers a memorandum saying that Goulart intended using the government-dominated trade unions to make an attack on the State of which he was head. A new constituent assembly would be called when the seizure of power was completed. This would be a prelude to a dictatorship. The

1. (Worcester; 1973; pp 226)
2. (See Stepan; 1971; pp 189)
3. (Stepan; 1971; pp 199)

memorandum reiterated the military's "historic role" as defender of constitutionalism and warned Goulart not to exceed his authority.[1]

Two days later, on 22nd March, a manifesto signed by 72 retired generals was circulated among officers announcing that the military had to obey the constitution and the President only "dentro dos limites da lei" (within the limits of the Law). The military's obligation to preserve and guarantee the government ceased when the government put itself outside the law by attacking the constitution and Congress.[2] Another obligation to the constitution was that the military itself must continue in existence to maintain order.

On 26th March, there broke out the sailors' and marines' rebellion in Rio de Janeiro, and four days later on 30th March President Goulart made his speech to the meeting of sergeants. This meeting was the second and final turning point in the fate of the Presidency, and was the "reactive swing event" which made clear to the military that if Goulart would not live up to his obligations to constitutionalism and the military the officers had to live up to theirs. With reluctance the legalist, moderate and pro-Goulart officers accepted the "defensive coup" plan, although its execution was held up for a day while General Kruel made a last appeal to Goulart. When the President refused to moderate his stand, Kruel ordered his tanks to move.[3]

After Goulart's departure, Ranieri Mazzilli became acting President, (according to the expectations of the conspirators) for the second time in three years.

1. (Worcester; I973; pp 228; Skidmore; I967; pp 296)
2. (Stepan; I97I; pp I04, I99, 202)
3. (Skidmore; I967; pp 300)

CHAPTER V

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SUPREME REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND

During the first few days of April I964, it appeared evident to the Brazilian public that the military was acting in accordance with the moderator tradition. João Goulart was in exile, and Ranieri Mazzilli now replaced him as acting President. The care-taker government would continue in office until October I965 when new elections would place a new administration in power. Effective power, however, remained not with Mazzilli but with the military Supreme Revolutionary Command (SRC) composed of the commanders-in-chief of the three services, headed by Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco.[1] On 9th April, the SRC decided to take the initiative itself. An Institutional Act was suddenly promulgated which greatly strengthened executive power and weakened the Brazilian Congress. Obstructionism was no longer possible and the President was given the power to annul for ten years the political rights of individuals, and to cancel the electoral mandates of members of state, municipal and federal legislatures.[2] Clearly the military was stepping beyond its traditional moderator role. Having declared that a new President must be installed within two days, the military then placed in that position its commander-in-chief, Marshal Castelo Branco. His new government then suspended the political rights of 378 people, all in accordance with the new Institutional Act. Among those banned from politics were President Goulart, ex-Presidents Kubitschek and Quadros, and six State governors.

1. (Worcester; I973; pp 229)
2. (Skidmore; I967; pp 308)

During the first year in power, the SRC introduced a much needed land reform measure. Heavy taxes were levied on large land owners forcing them to sell their land or increase production. Peasant movements, especially those set up by Francisco Julião in the Northeast were proscribed.[1] On 27th October I964 a second Institutional Act was gazetted which confirmed the preceding act, dissolved all political parties and made indirect the elections of the president and vice-president. Executive authority over the States was strengthened, and the Supreme Court was enlarged and weighted in favour of the SRC. The government was also exempted from judicial review.[2]

On the international scene, the SRC took immediate steps to realign Brazil with the US. The Brazilian contingent made up the largest part of the inter-American force occupying the Dominican Republic and Brazil now took the lead in the diplomatic campaign to set up an inter-American peace-keeping force.[3]

A third Institutional Act on 5th February I966 ended the popular, direct elections of governors and mayors. Governors would now be chosen by State legislatures and the governors would chose the town mayors.[4] Two new political parties were created: the Alianca Renovadora Nacional (National Renovating Alliance or ARENA) was the official government party representing the SRC, and Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement or MDB) was the official opposition party. A simultaneous purge of Congress and the

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 236)
2. (Burns; I97I; pp 374, Stepan; I97I; pp 256)
3. (Stepan; I97I; pp 232)
4. (Burns; I97I; pp 399)

new parties made the legislature a rubberstamp for the SRC.[1] This level of control made possible the promulgation of a new constitution on 24th January I967. It served to increase greatly executive power, and formalized the Institutional Acts in Brazil's political framework.

The head of the SRC and first-President of the republic, Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco, reaffirmed his decision to relinguish office, and he did so in March I967. He chose as his successor Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva who was then elected by Congress to a four year term, all in accordance with the new constitution.[2]

Substantial changes were made to the military government of the SRC on I3th December I968 when another Institutional Act was announced. It confered on the President full dictatorial power. Congress was disbanded and the State legislatures were closed down. The I967 Constitution was suspended and habeas corpus was waived. In a campaign of mass arrests, the military police took into custody Juscelino Kubitschek, Carlos Lacerda, and hundreds of students, newsmen and intellectuals. Costa e Silva explained that the threat of fratricidal conflict in Brazil necessitated the hard measures, and that the armed forces were being provoked by corruption and subversion.[3]

During its first four years in power, ruling as a military executive at the head of a constitutional administrative body, the SRC had exhibited a high degree of conservatism. Eventually, it found that the nuances of constitutionalism were too numerous and contradictory to

1. (Burns; I97I; pp 374)
2. (Burns; I97I; pp 375)
3. (Quartim; I97I; pp 72-73. Burns; I97I; pp 377-378)

Marshal Humberto
Castelo Branco,
leader of the Supreme
Revolutionary Command
1964 - 1967

Marshal Artur
Costa e Silva, who
succeeded Castelo Branco
in 1967.

Juscelino Kubitschek,
President of Brazil
1956 - 1960.

Jânio Quadros,
President of Brazil
1960 - 1961.

sustain indefinitely, so it soon rejected democratic forms for more direct, less subtle methods.

Numerous reasons account for the abandonment of the traditional moderator role of the Brazilian military. First it was absolutely vital to restore economic stability. A Three Year Plan for economic recovery and expansion was prepared, by Celso Furtado and San Tiago Dantas, but President Goulart lacked the fortitude and political power needed to force through unpopular but necessary measures. This situation remained when President Goulart was deposed in I964, but it was now in the military's power to force through those unpopular but necessary measures if it chose to do so. However, the military intended holding elections in October I965 in accordance with its moderator mandate, and in Article II of the first Institutional Act, it declared that it would hand power back to the civilians in January I966. Octávio Bulhões and Roberto Campos, who were civilian economic advisers to the SRC, urged a new vigorous anti-inflationary campaign.[1] Reluctantly, President Castelo Branco agreed to an amendment which extended his term of office to March I967. In agreeing to support economic recovery, the military government further rejected its traditional moderator role in Brazilian politics.

Second, the military was very concerned about the lack of strong political leadership in Brazil, and the breakdown of law and order. Shortly after he took over from the deposed Goulart, acting President Mazzilli felt strong military

1. (Skidmore; I967; pp 239-242, 248-25I, 3I0-3II. Refer also to the Institutional Act in Burns; I97I; pp 390-393)

pressure to obtain from Congress the same emergency anti-subversion powers Goulart had failed to obtain the previous October. These powers, which would involve military participation in the maintainence of law and order, were necessary not only to ensure political stability during economic recovery, but also to prevent the growth of violence and subversion. The military always favoured a high level of control, and so the SRC placed rigid controls on labour unions student movements and peasant organizations. Numerous institutions were closed down or purged.[1] The SRC detected communists every where and Chinese and Hungarian agents were reputed to be assisting Brazilian extremists.[2] Steps were taken to stop the spread of arms, stamp out subversion and remove from office those officials and governors who might threaten the SRC and the military.[3] These measures were especially necessary because when the SRC seized power and ignored its "terms of reference" as moderating power, it lost almost immediately most of its civilian support. The politicians and public, which expected Mazzilli to govern pending new elections, could not accept the sudden advent of an Institutional Act which appeared without legislative fiat, and prolonged the intervention. Nor did the Campos-Bulhoes plan recover for the military the public trust and respect it had lost. Castelo Branco placed great emphasis on the SRC economic recovery programme, and he was not detered by the

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 235)
2. (Worcester; I973; pp 225)
3. (See Article XIV of the second Institutional Act in Burns; I97I; pp 394-398)

bankrupcies, the decline in production, or the rise of unrest which resulted from the currency and import controls. It was hoped that the eventual success of the Campos-Bulhões plan would in itself justify the prolonged intervention and the drastic measures taken to restore the economy.

Third, the alterations made to the political s ystem by the SRC made it more difficult to return to it. Not since I889 had the Brazilian military committed itself so fervently to a political role, but in I964, it learned again that there can be no return to the past. The moderator role, which the military thought suspended only temporarily, was in fact destroyed totally.

The first two Institutional Acts which exceeded the public's expectation of the military's role also deprived the SRC of legitimiza tion. Having lost civilian respect and acceptance, the SRC had to rely more on repression for control. The military became very sensitive about its honour, but the SRC did not try to gain public support for itself or justify its policies.[1] As more national figures and politicians were jailed or banned from politics, it became more difficult to find men who were acceptable to the SRC, and who were competent to lead Brazil when the milita ry returned to the barracks. The politicians dislodged and disbarred by the SRC might return to power if elections were held to form a post-SRC civilian government, and most likely they would be hostile toward the military or individual officers who had abused them.

Another problem was the return of those officers who

1. (See Linz; pp 238, 253 in Stepan; (ed) I973)

had been purged by the SRC and the military. Amnesty was considered unacceptable, yet an agreement had to be reached with them. Quite clea rly, the military had under-estimated the problem of withdrawal from politics.[1]

Forth and perhaps the most important reason for abandoning the moderator role was the growing feeling through out Brazil that the political system was unworkable in times of rapid change. To the military the moderator role was no longer feasible when anarchy appeared more imminent, especially after the Black Friday rally. Formation of the SRC as Brazil's new government allowed the military to control the rising public and commercial unrest resulting from the Bulhões-Campos anti-inflation campaign. Much civilian middle class sympathy for the SRC was lost as a result of its economic measures.[2] The SRC also permitted the military to take up a new tutelary role.

Senior officers, including Marshal Castelo Branco, did have an intellectual committment to democracy and they hoped to return power to the politicians sometime in the future. The marshal wanted the elections scheduled for October I965 to continue, but he could not ignore the linha dura (hardline) officers in the corps. They were not prepared to repeat the old performance of turning power over to another subgroup of the same elite which might again lead Brazil into the cul de sac of corruption and chaos. The political rules would be changed to prevent this reoccuring. When candidates distrusted by the military were elected in numerous mayoral

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 2I9, 224-225)
2. (See Quartim; I97I; pp 57-58)

and gubernatorial elections during I965, the linha dura officers pressured Castelo Branco into issuing the second Institutional Act of October I965. This restored many of the special powers which had expired under the earlier act. The political rules were thus completely revised.[1]

Officers felt that part of their duty in power was to conduct an anti-corruption drive in Brazil and ride her of the old políticos. Many civilians were jailed or banned from politics for ten years. Governor Adhemar de Barros and ex-President Kubitschek were banned, although both of them had supported the Presidency of Castelo Branco in April I964. Unfortunately the military considered them too corrupt, and their support incompatible with honest military government.

To this extent, then, the SRC was moralistic. Officers believed that Brazil could prosper in the world only if leaders and people were honest, hard working, law abiding, moderate and respectful of authority. By maintaining constitutional forms, even if the elections were meaningless, the parties contrived and civil rights violated, the SRC tried to continue with Brazil's democratic system. The government wanted to end demagoguery and selfish opportunism while showing Brazilians how they should act in politics.[2]

Various groups within the officer corps contributed considerably to the rejection of the "moderator role" by the SRC. Three identifiable groups tried to direct policy. The linha dura officers, who were authoritarian nationalists believed that politicians were too corrupt to hold power and that the military should take over completely. In their

1. (See Skidmore; I967; pp 307, 3I2; Quartim; I97I; pp 55 Stepan; I97I; pp 256; Burns; I97I; pp 374)
2. (See Sanders; AUFS; (ECSA) Vol XIV no 5; I970; pp 2-3, 6-7, Stepan; I97I; pp 220)

considered opinion, Brazil could not function effectively as an economic entity within the old open political system regardless who was President. Also the anti-inflation programme, which was so necessary, was certainly impossible under the democratic system. Even Quadros and Goulart had realized that anti-democratic solutions were necessary.[1] Discontent created by the economic measures of the SRC justified absolutist government. Despite their rather definite ideas, the linha dura officers comprised a rather amorphous group.[2]

A second group of officers was the linha branda (soft line). They prefered a short term intervention in accordance with the military's traditional moderator role. A third group was comprised of those officers who were strongly influenced by the Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior War College or ESG). They prefered to let competent civilian technocrats run the country under military aegis, and were generally more tolerant and cautious than the linha dura. From the ESG group came the Chief of Staff, Castelo Branco himself.[3]

The first two Institutional Acts showed that the linha dura officers had a strong influence on the SRC. Public dislike of the measures taken to deflate and control the economy,, and the need for time for the measures to work recommended to the SRC the linha dura view. Greater military control was taken of the country and Castelo Branco had to renege on election plans. However, the new military President

1. (Skidmore; 1967; pp 318, 320)
2. (See Stepan; RAND; R-586-DOS; April 1971; pp 112)
3. (See Young; pp 461-462 in Burnett and Johnson (ed) 1968)

was not dominated by the younger nationalist officers. They wanted the suspension of the political rights of some 5,000 "enemies" of the SRC but only 378 persons were actually affected. Nor were the linha dura officers able to extend the duration of certain expired articles in the first Institutional Act. The employment by the SRC of two civilian economists, Octavio Bulhões and Roberto Campos, ignored the younger officers' preference for rejecting any civilian help. Encouragement of US penetration in the Brazilian economy also ran contrary to nationalist, linha dura wishes. President Castelo Branco and the SRC were essentially moderate in outlook and more responsive to the needs of the situation than to linha dura advice.[1]

The new President was closely associated with the ESG and its developmentalist, anti-communist, and pro-US ideology. The ESG gave senior officers, lessons in planning, order, and rational financing, and also confirmed the indivisibility of security and development issues,[2] but it was during March - April 1964 that they saw the opportunity offered by a prolonged intervention to restore Brazil's economy, in association US investment and civilian technocrats. The military could purge and reform the country's political and economic systems.

Many senior officers including Castelo Branco had served in Italy in the Fôrça Expedicionária Brasileira (Brazilian Expeditionary Force or FEB) during World War II. This experience showed the officers that power was a result of organization, technology, industry and democratic, capitalist

1. (See Skidmore; 1967; pp 309-310)
2. (Stepan; RAND, R-586-DOS; April 1971; pp 85)

ideology, not of personalism and demagoguery. Democracy encouraged initiative and dynamism in a country, especially in economics. The best, the most talented and hardest working could take advantage of the competitive nature of a truly democratic society. This was the conservatism of personal liberty above social equality.

The success of the allied war effort in World War II was a cogent reminder of the efficacy of capitalism and democracy. In comparison, the collapse of Mussolini's Italy showed the FEB campaigners the abject failure of totalitarianism and demagoguery. These beliefs were so strong that the military made virtually no attempt to justify the prolonged intervention, prefering instead to rely on suppression rather than enlightenment and forbearance. To this extent, the authoritarianism, the distrust of others and the elitist conservatism inherent in the military institution tended to predominate when military men reacted to criticisms of their actions.

Criticism meant two things to the military. First it was a slight to the profession and its honour, and second, if the criticism continued or appeared valid to non-partisan observers, military credibility was threatened. Signs of weakness or indecision might encourage subversion or insurgency. Groups might attempt to destroy the State and its military protector if that State and its protector were thought to be vulnerable. President Castelo Branco and the ESG were very much aware of the dangers of subversion. For many years the ESG had taught counter-insurgency and revolutionary warfare.[1]

1. (Stepan; 1971; pp 130)

To a great degree ESG teaching provided the SRC with a working ideology. It stressed a national development-national security nexus, whereby the mobilization of Brazil's resources and US investment would increase national wealth, thus facilitating national security. Although domestic security could be realized by sating discontent with improved conditions and better opportunities, the SRC was to reject any reform programme which might neutralize discontent and rely instead on expanded economic production and the traditional "trickle down" theory of attaining social justice. Until economic fortune benefitted the impoverished, the SRC permitted those independent and private organizations set up in the I950's to continue operating in lieu of a State reform and relief programme.[1]

Self generating wealth could provide the economic stability and confidence that a democratic society needed, but the ESG also believed that since war was imminent between the world's two irreconciliable power blocs, Brazil also needed strength to help maintain the external and hemispheric status quo. As the traditional ally of the US, Brazil would exercise regional hegemony and combat internal aggression.[2] To fulfill this national security doctrine, Brazil would need wealth and powerful, reliable armed forces. Initially, political and social suppression were necessary to promote the political order and economic recovery vital for future development. The suppression was also necessary because the ESG-SRC preferences for

1.. (See Burns; I97I; pp 372; Sanders; AUFS; (ECSA) Vol XIV No. 5; Dec. I970; pp I6; Mutchler; SCID; Vol I No 8; I965 pp I08, I09; Skidmore; I967; pp 9)
2. (See Latin America; Vol VII; No 22; Friday Ist June I973; pp I72-I73; Stepan; I97I; pp I29, I78-I82)

the US created discontent among nationalists in both the military and society. Neutrality in the Cold War, and denunciation of the US, as advocated by the nationalists were considered by military men including Castelo Branco to be unrealistic, dangerous and unwise. Not to take a strong stand against communism was to encourage it in Brazil. Strategically placed, unevenly populated, regional, and in parts poverty stricken, she would make an ideal communist State in South America. Cold War tensions, and Castro's vow to "export revolution" strengthened the military's anti-communism. For security as well as economic reasons, the rising tide of nationalism had to be thoroughly subordinated to Brazil's strategic role in the Cold War.[1]

The SRC gained an early reputation for heavy handed authoritarianism and suppression, but this was more a result of circumstance as the military saw it, and not because the officer corps was dedicated to the linha dura position.[2] Despite interpretations to the contrary, Marshal Castelo Branco was a modera te in the officer corps, a military figure who was beyond reproach in Brazil. He had the prestige among officers to hold them together during the stress and strain of intervention.[3] His prestige suited him admirably for the strategic position of "swing man" in both the displacement and replacement of the Goulart administration.[4]

The prolonged intervention called for sustained military unity since disunity would mean vulnerability to subversion,

1. (See Burns; I97I; pp 370)
2. (See Skidmore; I967; pp 304)
3. (See Stepan; I97I; pp 2I7 and Burns; I97I pp 370)
4. (See Needler; pp 239-240 in Von Lazar & Kaufman (ed)I969)

indecision and possible public humiliation. So it was that I22 officers were expelled from the corps by their collegues in April I964 alone.[1] Opinion within the corps would be fairly and safely, homogenous.

Compromise, as in I96I with regard to Goula rt's return, was not possible after I964. Power in Brazil was now the sole preserve of the Castelo Branco and the ESG group of officers. The linha dura officers were often in conflict with this group. They wanted to see a higher degree of economic-nationalism in the SRC policies, and they disapproved of the positive stand taken by the ESG on economic liberalism and foreign involvement in the economy. Some linha dura officers also wanted a more populist, left-wing reformist government.[2] Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva appeared more sympathetic to the younger, nationalist officers than had Castelo Branco. As President after March I967, he tended toward a more humanist and nationalist government, but he did not represent the linha dura group.[3] Costa e Silva was more moderate, more tolerant and less conservative than his predecessor, and when he took office he reduced the level of repression exercised by Castelo Branco. However, the reduced control made possible, or perhaps encouraged, an increase in the level of popular unrest. To military men, unrest was anathema because it threatened control, order and security. Costa e Silva realized that if this unrest hardened into disorder a leadership crisis was imminent. This necessitated the fifth Institutional Act of December I968

1. (Stepan; I97I; pp 223)
2. (Stepan; I97I; pp 25I-252)
3. (Stepan; I97I; pp 252; Burns; I97I; pp 375)

which formalized power in a military dictatorship and suspended democracy indefinitely. The process, begun in April I964, was completed.

By answering Brazil's "leadership crisis" in this way, the military conformed to a tradition of militarism long established in Latin American history.

CHAPTER VI

THE MILITARY IN PERU

It was a leadership crisis which precipitated the first military intervention in Peru. While Congress debated constitutional issues, a large royalist army prepared to advance on Lima and destroy the new republic. Desperate for men, money and decisive leadership, the army overthrew the Congress in February I823. The new military president, José de la Riva Agüero organized and equipped a national army to defend Lima and Peru's Independence. The army took power because civilians were failing to provide leadership.

In the post-independence period, Peru experienced civil war, regional insurrection and political conspiracy. This chaotic situation was made possible by the numerous semi-autonomous armies in Peru, which were recruited and equipped regionally, and led by ambitious military caudillos. These men fought for ideological reasons, power or money, and by doing so accentuated Peru's disunity. Arequipa and Cuzco were hot beds of discontent and revolution. Attempts were made to force the union of Peru and Bolivia, while Southern Peru even considered secession.[1]

Soldiers had little respect for civilians and politicians. Because of the long campaign, tardy civilian support and political wrangling, military men began to hate the civilian creoles of the cities and they assumed for themselves the right as valiant patriots to govern the country they had fought to liberate. Nor were military presidents able to

1. Marett; I969; pp 83; Pike; I967; pp 83-87)

assert authority in Peru because the national or republican army was so regionalized and lacking in monopoly of force. In I835, President General Luis José de Orbegoso was overthrown by conservative, autocratic-minded officers with church and oligarchic support. They believed in strong executive power, and objected to a new constitution which gave power to the liberal-dominated Congress.[1]

The ana rchic, civil war conditions prevailing in Peru were primarily a result of forceful seizures of power by liberator-caudillos and their resisting rivals' attempts to overthrow them. This political brutality continued until the I840's when the last of the liberator-caudillos had departed, to be succeeded by General Ramón Castilla who ruled twice from I845 to I85I and from I854 to I862. He was able to bring order to Peru more by moderation, and compromise mingled with firmness than by coercion.[2] Conflict and dissension were minimized by appeals to both liberals and conservatives and by increases in State coercive power. Using the financial resources of the republic, Castilla purchased modern equipment, opened a military school at Bellavista, sent officers abroad to study, and established a navy. The large, permanent army he maintained, which grew out of the "revolutionary rabble" of independence, was frequently used to destroy the less well equipped armies of the caudillos who tried to overthrow the government in civil wa rs. By spending heavily on the military Ramón Castilla sought not only to ensure strong, stable government and national unity, but also to force foreign

1. (Pike; I967; pp 74)
2. (Pike; I967; pp 94, I06, I09)

General Ramón Castilla, President of Peru 1845 - 1851, 1854 - 1862.

compliance with Peru's laws and customs. He was particularly concerned about Chilean and US designs in Latin America.

Ramón Castilla proceeded also to modernize Peru, promulgating in I860 a constitution which made her a strongly unified and centralized republic with a powerful executive. It proscribed regionalism and private armies, and suppressed military fueros (privileges). The constitution suited the church, oligarchy and military, all of which wanted stability, control, and protection of status quo interests. It did not appeal to urban dwellers and liberals who sought greater representative, legislative power. In I866 a conservative military president was deposed in a mass uprising, but a counter-revolution by the military with oligarch and church support reaffirmed the centralism and authoritarianism of the Peruvian state.

In I872, the military found that it could no longer govern Peru by simple virtue of its prestige or power, and that it could no longer dominate politics. Manuel Pardo was elected Peru's first civilian president, defeating the "official" military candidate. Pardo also antagonised the military by pledging to replace it with a national guard and thus remove the military from political life. Instead of a permanent standing army, Peru would have a militia which would be mobilized only when internal security was in danger. Since it would "exist" only infrequently, the national guard-militia would have less political power and be more easily controlled.

The Minister of War, Colonel Tomás Gutiérrez led the army in the overthrow of Pardo's new government and announced a dictatorship,[1] but in Lima, the populace arose to defend

1. (See Pike; I967; pp I3I-I32; Marett; I969; pp I03-I04)

Pardo, and a nightmare of violence, murder and mutilation resulted. Rioting mobs lynched Gutiérrez, and hysterical soldiers killed ex-President Balta. For the second time in six years, a mass uprising had surprised and overthrown a military president who had military support. It disgraced the military and encouraged the civilismo (civilianism) cause. Despite its valiant defence of Callao harbour against an attacking Spanish naval force in I866,[1] the military no longer had the prestige or accepted right to dominate politics. In disgrace and disarray, the military accepted without demur President Pardo's military reforms and reductions of armed strength. 75% of the army became instantly unemployed when it was reduced to 2,500 men, and contracts with British ship yards for two new warships were cancelled. For security Pardo relied on diplomacy,[2] and his new National Guard. Military revolts against the new policies were put down by loyal army units and the new Guard.[3] Military disunity was so pronounced that army and navy units fought each other in support of their respective leader-candidates for the I876 elections. The uncertainty of military coercive power permitted widespread violence and assassination throughout the I870's.

The pitiful state of Peruvian military might encouraged Chilean aggression in I879. Diplomatic efforts failed to obtain vital security pacts with Argentina and US, and the

1. (War developed between Spain and Peru over some quite minor disagreements, but Peru really feared that Spain was trying to re-assert herself in the Latin American Continent, especially after Spain had re-annexed Santo Domingo in I86I. Marett; I969;. pp II2-II3; See below Chapter VI pp 89)
2. (Peru made efforts to improve and consolidate relations with Argentina and US in the hope that security pacts might eventuate.)
3. (See Pike; I967; pp I38)

valour and enthusiasm of the Peruvian defenders failed to compensa te for the lack of strong, permanently mobilized armed forces.[1] In the post War of the Pacific period after I883, during a time of political and military disunity, civilians permitted the military to govern and reconstruct war-torn Peru. The defeat by Chile, the unresolved border disputes with Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, and military infirmity emphasised the dire need for a powerful, reliable and respected war machine.

In I895, military president Cáceres manipulated election results to prolong his stay in power. Civilistas, oligarchs, liberals and the montoñeros guerrilla fighters made an informal alliance, accepted the leadership of "Democratic Caudillo" Nicolas Piérola and marched against Cáceres and his military dictatorship. Realizing that he could not rule in the face of civil war, Cáceres resigned. Armed civilians had again overthrown a military government. Military monopolization of power, as in the days prior to I872 was no longer possible.

President Piérola realized that permanent, standing armed forces were vital for security, but he also wanted to discourage militarism and ensure government control of the military. A modernization programme was instituted which radically changed the na ture of the Peruvian military. Professional pride was encouraged, new military schools built offering a scientific, technical education, and reliable salà ries and pensions were assured.[2] The Chorrillos military school was opened in I896, an obligatory service law was

1. See Pike; 1967; pp 143-147
2. Pike; 1967; pp 173

enacted and a French military mission was hired in I898. The military's increased bureaucratic, and professional nature, the greater unity, discipline and regimentation all helped reduce the propensity for intervention. [1] Modernization was intended not only to depoliticalize the military but also to defend Peru's soverignty since border disputes had re-opened with Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Brazil.

In February I9I4, I9 years after the last military intervention, the military acted again, deposing the civilian President Guillermo Billinghurst. The reforms and abrasive manner of Billinghurst antagonised conservative Civilistas who approached the military for relief. They warned the officers that the President had dictational plans and intended ceding territory to Chile. The army had a duty, they declared, to preserve constitutional proceedure by deposing the dangerous Billinghurst.[2] The army also faced the prospect of further reductions in budget allocation.

After the coup d'etat, General Oscar R. Benavides headed a junta which governed until elections were held in March I9I5. The duration of intervention was short because the military was unwilling to take the lead from civilians.

In July I9I9, some units co-operated with the henchmen of Augusto B. Leguía, and placed him forcefully in the presidency. Reasons for military co-operation are not clear, but could have been in retaliation for budget cuts by the deposed government, or a desire among officers to participate in a new political movement.

1. (See Pike; I967; pp I74; North; I966; pp 24)
2. (Pike; I967; pp 20I; North; I966; pp 25)

To rule as a dictator, Leguía needed military support and to obtain this he almost destroyed the Peruvian military as a disciplined, unified and cohesive body. The airforce he created fostered inter-service rivalry, and his Guardia Civil competed with the army and destroyed its armed supremacy. When he bought and promoted officers in favour, Leguía destroyed the autonomy of the officer corps.[1] The cuartreros (horse thieves) officers precluded any concerted effort by officers to resist injury to their profession.[2] When the I930 depression made it impossible for Leguía to continue buying milita ry support, Lieutenant Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro gained the support he had long sought to depose the dictator.

In I930, there appeared in Peru a new political party which threatened the military as an institution for three decades. Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) was a continent-wide party, but its only significant cell was the Peruvian which was an extremely well organized, elitist and disciplined socialist party. Its "Minimum Programme" advocated the disbandment and replacement of the military. Led by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, APRA presented a grave threat to the military. It had the arms, organization, discipline and leadership to compete with the army, and to undermine it from within.[3]

APRA quickly gained itself a violent reputation. It was believed to be implicated in naval and army mutinies against Sánchez Cerro. It was able to fight a full fledged civil war against the army, and with the near assassination

1. (Welch & Smith; I974; pp I48)
2. (See Rozman; JIAS: Vol XII No 4; I970; pp 548-550)
3. (Marett; I969; pp I55. For an excellent account of the foundation a nd support of APRA see Klarén I973; Welch & Smith; I974; pp I50)

Marshal Oscar R Benavides,
President of Peru
1914 - 1915, 1933 - 1939.

Augusto B Leguía,
President of Peru
1908 - 1912, 1919 - 1930.

ABOVE: Lieutenant Colonel Luis Sánchez Cerro, President of Peru 1930 - 1933

ABOVE and BELOW:
Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, founder and leader of APRA.

of the dictator, indicated the fanatical determination of its membership. Of vital significance to the military, APRA and Peruvian politics was the Trujillo Massacre of July I932, when APRA fighters killed some soldiers they had captured during an uprising in Trujillo. The army, which suppressed the revolt, responded by killing many of its Aprista prisoners. As a consequence, both APRA and the military feared retribution if one should ever overwhelm the other. Anti-APRA feeling ran so deep in the military that every year since it remembered the (first) Trujillo Massacre with a day of mourning for fallen comrades, killed by APRA.[1]

The civil war between the military and APRA and an escalating war with Colombia were ended in April I933 when Sánchez Cerro was assassinated. His successor, General Benavides took a moderate line and refused to impose an extremist, hard line, fascist rule. He reduced repression and freed political prisoners. He also insisted on a high level of honesty during his rule to I939 and instituted numerous reforms. Benavides created a social security system and expanded education, communications and public works. The military was re-organized and re-equipped. A German military mission was hired and professionalism, weakened by Leguia was reaffirmed. Unfortunately, Peru remained torn during the I930's by extremists of both the left (APRA) and the right (fascist Unión Revolucionaria set up by Sánchez Cerro). In March I939, President Benavides had to suppress another well planned APRA - inspired military revolt. The

1. (See Lieuwen; I964; pp 28-29)

party seemed very adept at gaining the support of the lower ranks of the military and thus undermining its solidarity.

José Luis Bustamante y Rivero was elected President in I945 with the support of APRA but the party, which controlled Congress, attempted instead to undermine his Presidential authority. As Bustamante found it more difficult to rule through Congress he came to rely more on the military to govern. Violence and terrorism, usually associated with APRA, increased. Bustamante and the military realized that Haya and APRA were as unreliable, ambitious, violent and subversive as ever.

During I947, President Bustamante filled his cabinet posts with officers and ruled by decree. In February I948, there was a revolt of junior officers of the army and navy. APRA was again believed to be implicated. Further military revolts were crushed by loyal forces, but finally in October I948, General Manuel Odría issued a pronunciamiento which was supported by units in Lima. Bustamante who lacked military power, resigned, and Odría took over as head of a new junta.[1]

To combat the growing disorder, Odría passed a harsh decree of Internal Security which gave him complete power to deal as he saw fit with his enemies. He used this authority frequently because of the growing popular disapproval of his rule. In I950 he manipulated elections to make himself President for a constitutional term. The junta of I948, which served as a provisional government, was dissolved.

Odría realized that he could not rule for long without popular consent and co-operation. Aware of the growing

1. (See Marett; I969; pp I7I-I75; Lieuwen; I964; pp 28-29, and Lieuwen; I96I; pp I43-I45)

discontent of the labouring classes, Odría announced his sympathy, provided work on new government projects, improved pay and conditions and set up welfare schemes. Like Leguía, Sánchez Cerro and Benavides, Odría was anti-union, not anti-worker in his conservatism.[1]

Political opposition hibernated until I956 when Odría's constitutional term of office was to expire. Unrest among bureaucrats, military and businessmen was minimized by financial pay offs. Corruption, bribery and peculation were commonplace during Odría's ochenio (eight years in power). Inflation and debt were consequences of lavish public spending and a fall in export prices. Popular discontent and military concern prevailed on Odría who obeyed the constitution and stood down in the I956 elections.

To the presidency was elected, for the second time, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, who had almost completed this second term of office when he was overthrown in July I962. The military wanted to cancel an election result it did not like. In the I962 elections, APRA had won sufficient seats in Congress to make Haya de la Torre the most likely choice to succeed Prado as President.[2] After thirty years of conflict, the Peruvian military still distrusted and feared APRA. That an APRA government still posed a threat to it was confirmed in I960 when the party announced that atomic warfare had made the Latin American military obselete.[3]

Initially, the military applied pressure on Haya to stand down, and on the National Election Jury and President

1. (See Payne; I965; pp 5I)
2. (For election results see Marett; I969; pp I85-I86)
3. (Van Cleve; IAEA: Vol 30 no 4; Spring I977;pp 40)

Prado to declare the elections void. The military also rejected another presidential term for Odría on APRA support.[1] Younger officers prefered the young, reformist, and popular technocrat Fernando Belaúnde Terry, but he had been excluded from the Presidency by the voting. Higher ranking officers also prefered the Acción Popular candidate. Perhaps it was significant also that the army commander, General Nicolás Lindley López, had personal and family ties with Belaúnde Terry.[2]

The military junta of the four officers of Comando Conjunto took over the government and exiled President Prado. Headed by General Pérez Godoy, the junta declared that the election was fraudulent, politicians irresponsible and the National Election Jury inefficient.[3] Although rather authoritarian, and believing that the army could do better than civilians in tackling Peru's problems, General Pérez Godoy promised free elections for June 1963.[4] In the interim the junta took a moderate approach to government, - the press was uncensored, and civil rights were respected. It even initiated reforms, setting up several pilot land reform projects and training labourers. Instituto de Planificación Nacional (or National Planning Institute.) was established, as well as Banco de la Vivienda, which extended low-interest credit for buying houses and clearing slums.[5]

In March 1963, the army commander, Lindley López, suddenly replaced Pérez Godoy as Chief President of the junta.

1. (See Patch; AUFS:(WCSA) Vol IX No 6; Sept. 1962 pp 8,13 & 15)
2. (Needler; pp 243 in Von Lazar and Kaufman (ed) 1969)
3. (See Lieuwen; 1964; pp 27-29)
4. (Marett; 1969; pp 187)
5. (Pike; 1967; pp 301; Patch; AUFS (WCSA) Vol X No 1 July 1963; pp 5)

The reshuffled junta accused Pérez of being dictatorially-minded and personalist. He had ignored the mandatory date for his retirement from service, and was no longer consulting the other three co-presidents of the junta. He had also resumed contact with his old friend Odría, and was showing reluctance to hold elections. It appeared that the events of I948-I950 might repeat themselves.[1] General Pérez Godoy did not respond to these attacks or resist his removal since this would lead to the further politicalization of the military. The new junta did not renege on its pledge to hold free elections in June I963. Electoral reforms enacted by the junta eliminated the minor candidates, and Belaúnde, benefitting from his third attempt, was decisively elected President.

Militarism developed very quickly in Peru. The landed elites, which could have provided civilian leadership in the post-independence period stayed out of politics to repair their war torn lands. The military stayed close to politics because it feared replacement by a militia and the reduction or abolition of their pensions.[2] By its dislike of civilians, the military also gained a sense of superiority and confidence that justified to the officers their political involvements.[3]

The recovery and growth of the Peruvian economy after I845 facilitated peace, stability and unity, and ended civil-war militarism. The expansion of State and military power made it impossible for caudillos and private armies to compete with army, and accordingly ensured the political dominance

1. (Patch; AUFS: (WCSA) Vol X No. I; July I963 pp 6)
2. (Rozman; JIAS: Vol XII No. 4; October I970; pp 540-542; Villarán; I900; quoted in Tulchin (ed) I973; pp 360-36I)
3. (Said Simon Bolívar to the Peruvian officers in I824: "you (are) among the first saviours of Peru" See Lieuwen; I964; pp 28)

of the military, and the economic and social dominance of the oligarchy. The military needed money, the oligarchy wanted security. Between the two groups there developed an affinity of interest which figured behind the subsequent history of Peruvian politics.[1]

Up to I872 militarism involved continuismo (prolonged office holding) and the protection of the oligarchy from peasant land invasions and strikes. However, the overthrow of the military government by mass, popular uprising in I872 indica ted that public opinion could no longer be flouted. The confidence, co-operation and acceptance of the public were now vital pre-requisites for military intervention and government.

During the presidency of Manuel Pardo (I872-I876) the military learned that reduced political power could mean reduced military coercive power which in turn endangered territorial soverignity. The temporary occupation in I866 by Spain of the guano Chincha Islands which were vital to Peru's economy , and the permanent loss to Chile of the valuable Peruvian-Bolivian nitrate fields in the War of the Pacific made the Peruvian military highly sensitive about its coercive power, and any issues affecting it.[2] Only the military and conservative, oligarch-dominated governments would maintain military strength.

When the war against Chile was over, there was a partial return to the old caudillo rivalist-faction militarism of the post-independence period. Soldiers governed because everybody

1. (See Marett; I969; pp 95. North; I966; pp 22)
2. (See Einaudi; RAND: R-586-DOS: April I97I; pp 64)

accepted their ability to rebuild a defeated Peru. It was an emergency situation, but the republic had developed too much politically and socially to permit the old militarism to continue. The war hero and military caudillo Agustín Cáceres, who wanted the presidency, realized that he had to conform to political styles and so accordingly his partisans set up for him a new political party, Partido Constitucional. It was no longer possible to rely solely on military force for political support. Patriotism and courage in war did not bring legitimacy in politics, especially when the public mood was anti-militarist.

After the I895 mass uprising against Cáceres, the military had to accept the growing power of civilian politics. This realization was as vital to the future of civil-military relations in Peru as was the modernization and professionalization of the military under taken by Piérola. Entrance, promotion and training were standardized, unity, efficiency and esprit de corps grew. As a disciplined hierachic and bureaucratic structure the military became less involved in politics and less subject to the personalist leadership or domination of individual officers.

The decline of military interventionism after I895 was not due exclusively to professionalism. Quite simply, civilians' adherence to the socio-economic, and legal status quo also led to political stability.[1] Few calls were made by civilians on the military to intervene in politics. When civilian approaches to the military did succeed as in I9I4 they were related also to professional, institutional security

1. (See Nun; I969; pp 25, 30, 44)

of the military itself, rather than to individual officers' self improvement. The military accepted its constitutional obligations and permitted itself to be used to maintain order and protect the interests of the groups in power, according to law.[1]

The adherence of the middle classes to the oligarch status quo weakened in I9I2 when Billinghurst was elected. The Conservatives and oligarchs of the aging Civilista party[2] encouraged the milita ry to depose Billinghurst since they could not deal with him, or would not accept him.

From independence to I872, and from the defeat by Chile to I895, the military intervened on its own initiative to fill a political void left by apathetic or irresponsible politicians. In I9I4 the military no longer acted at whim and had to be cajoled with appeals to its senses of responsibility and preservation. The coup d'etat none-the-less reaffirmed the affinity of interest of military and oligarchy, and was essentially preventative, not aimed at furthering military or individual political power.[3]

In I9I9, military unity was sufficiently weak to permit a few units to place Leguía in power in a sudden putsch. During the oncenio (eleven years in power) Leguía prevented a military counter-revolt by undermining its discipline and unity, and thus risking Peruvian security. It was only after numerous attempts that Sánchez Cerro obtained the support he needed in Lima to depose Leguía.

1. (See Payne; I965; pp 38)
2. (The same party, which under Pardo in the I870's had tried so hard to remove the military from politics)
3. (See Welch and Smith; I974; pp I47. Einaudi; RAND R-586-DOS: April I97I; pp 34)

By I930 the military-oligarch affinity was beginning to weaken because officers were starting to sympathize with reformist and modernizing groups, including APRA. For a time, friendship and co-operation marked relations between APRA and the military. The mestizo origins of many officers corresponded to the indigenista ideology of APRA, and Sánchez Cerro himself was considered a reformer and modernizer.[1]

Unfortunately, as a result of the Trijillo Massacre, APRA doomed the military to remain involved in politics in support of conservatism and status quo. The military could not condone APRA-led change if it also meant change to its own existence and autonomy. Change or progress of any sort had to be strictly controlled by the military. Consequently the military prefered to manage national affairs on its own rather than allow modernizing civilians to do so.[2]

The pronunciamiento which brought General Odría to power in I948 also aimed to prevent an APRA revolution by replacing Bustamante's powerless government with a military one. The military had a responsibility to guard the State against subversion.[3] Concerned about social upheaval, it also realized that change, not repression was a desirable, if not vital goal. Odría showed by his reforms, and the military's acceptance of them that the military-oligarchy affinity was ended.[4]

The ochenio of Odría had a major affect on the military. Many officers, proud of their careers, were ashamed of the repressive role they had played for both the oligarchy and

1.. (Einaudi; RAND: R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 59. See also Pike; I967; pp 254-255)
2. (Welch and Smith; I974; pp I49)
3. (See Article 2I3 Title I2 of the I933 Constitution in Einaudi; RAND: R-586-DOS: April I97I; pp 33)
4. (Lieuwen; I964; pp 32-34; Cotler; SCID Vol VI No 5 I970-7I; pp 95)

Odría. They wanted to withdraw completely from politics, reject the links with the oligarchy and improve the army's prestige which had fallen so much. Many younger officers felt that the army could embrace a reform programme or take an active part in a civilian programme. Some even supported the presidential candidacy of Fernando Belaúnde Terry in I956. The extent of military autonomy was apparent during the second presidency of the oligarch Manuel Prado (I956-I962) when forty airforce officers forced the President to rescind transfer orders for a particular airforce general.[1] The military was prepared to defy the representative of its former oligarch allies.

The I962 coup d'etat showed that the Peruvian military had a high standard of professionalism, expertise and unity not seen since I9I4. It showed also the trend set in I948 that senior, general officers led interventions, not the intermediate jefe ranking officers. Personalist or ideological leadership at any level was now replaced by a completely rigid general-to-private institutional authority. The I962 junta was non-personalist, non-caudillo and purely institutional in nature. Prodding by civilians was not evident but public response to the intervention indicated that the military had not misjudged the civilian mood of despondency.[2]

During their stay in power (I962-I963), military men made it clear that in the coming elections, they favoured Belaúnde Terry and his Acción Popular. First, Belaúnde was a reformist and technocrat who appeared to offer Peru the

1. (The general concerned, Vargas Prada, was later in the junta which replaced Prado in I962. Lieuwen; I964; pp 29-30; Patch; AUFS;(WCSA) Vol IX No 6; Sept. I962; pp I5)
2. (Patch; AUFS: (WCSA) Vol IX No. 6; Sept. I962; pp 5-6)

leadership she needed. Second, Belaúnde could be relied upon not to seek APRA support against the military[1] and third, he was a nationalist, whose views reflected those of the military: during the 1963 election campaign the AP candidate had declared that he would solve within 90 days of inauguration the "problem" involving the International Petroleum Company.[2]

1. (Cotler; SCID: Vol VI No 5; 1970-71; pp 98-99)
2. (Olson; JDA: Vol 9 No 3; April 1975; pp 396)

CHAPTER VII

THE COUP D'ETAT of I968

For many years, the International Petroleum Company, (a Canadian firm owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey) had stirred Peruvian xenophobia and nationalism. Holding 80% of the domestic petroleum market, and prominent in Peru's oil industry for forty years, the IPC symbolised Peru's colonialism, foreign exploitation and underdevelopment. Difficulties had long existed between Peruvian governments and the IPC over territorial concessions, sub-soil rights and company profits, and although Belaúnde had promised to solve these problems within three months of taking office, negotiations dragged on for five years.[1]

When an agreement was reached on Ist October I968, there was a public and Congressional outcry because page eleven which dealt with profits, was found to be missing from the document accepted by the government. Belaúnde's cabinet resigned on 2nd October. After two days of political indecision and national indignation, the military intervened. Belaúnde was exiled, and an all-military junta, the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (RMG) was formed. The IPC deal was cancelled, and on IOth October, I968, the RMG headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado confiscated the IPC installations in Peru. Later in the month, the RMG declared that there would be no immediate return to constitutional government.

Numerous reasons can be given to explain the coup d'etat

1. (Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No 3; April I975; pp 396. Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-I97I; pp IOI)

of October I968. According to the deposed president, the military feared an APRA victory in the I969 elections.[1] The military had supported Belaúnde's candidacy in I962 and I963 because of his rejection of APRA,[2] but unfortunately, Belaúnde's party, Acción Popular, never a strong cohesive party, had begun to break up by the mid-I960's. This coincided with the break up of the alliance between APRA and the conservative, right-wing party of General Odría. A new coalition began to emerge of APRA and the middle class urban faction of the disintegrating AP. This coalition might have become a potent political force capable of winning the next Presidential election.[3]

A second reason for intervention was the military's traditional concern about APRA coercive power which threatened to grow, as in the early I930's, when economic conditions worsened. This was particularly evident in the Aprista strongholds in the northern coastal sugar and cotton plantations. The military wanted stronger control in the north to prevent a resurgence of APRA subversion, terrorism and rebellion.[4]

A third reason was the need for effective government. After the I963 elections, Belaúnde faced overwhelming APRA-UNO opposition in Congress and his own popularity declined.[5] ARRA and UNO in Congress reduced funds for numerous projects and reforms. They also tried to make the Belaúnde government appear responsible for the failures of

1. (See Clinton; IAEA Vol 24 No 4 Spring I97I; pp 45)
2. (See Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-I97I; pp 98-99)
3. (See Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-I97I; pp I00-I0I; Welch & Smith; I974; pp I63)
4. (How socio-economic conditions made possible APRA power and resilience refer to Klarén; I973)
5. (Welch & Smith; I974; pp I62)

peasant reform.[1] Such obstruction was possible because the I933 Constitution gave Congress great importance in Peru's political process.[2] The APRA-UNO-dominated Congress forced on the Belaunde government nearly I00 cabinet changes in five years.

Contributing to the loss of effective government was the attitude of the US, which reduced or withheld aid and credit until the IPC "problem" was cleared up. Nor was US ambassador in Peru pleased to find APRA rejected by the government and the military, since the US believed it to be Peru's best agent for reform under the Alliance for Progress.[3] Effective government was vital in Peru, first, because society was so dependent on regulation,[4] and second because only the State could initiate the reforms and development that Peru so desperately needed. To the military, effective government meant centralized government, and when Belaunde permitted provincial and municipal elections to be held for the first time in forty years, he encouraged regionalism and endangered Statism. Even worse, the elections benefitted the highly regionalist APRA and UNO parties which trailed the AP-DC vote by a mere 0.6%. After thirty months in power, the government failed to win a decisive and resounding victory against the opposition.[5] APRA, UNO and regionalism inhibited effective government.

A forth reason for intervention was to gain greater political control of Peru to prevent future peasant-guerrilla

1. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-I97I; pp 99)
2. (Executive power in Peru is not as great as that of other Latin American countries. See Chaplin; pp 30 in Chaplin; (ed) I976)
3. (Welch & Smith; I974; pp I75. APRA was also considered to be a reliable anti-communist party. See also Van Cleve; IAEA; Vol. 30 No. 4; Spring 1977; pp 37-39.
4. (See Payne; I967; pp 2I8-2I9)
5. (See Alisky; pp 3II in Burnett & Johnson; (ed) I968)

insurgency. Hugo Blanco, and later Luís de la Puente, etcetra, indicated a growing rural political crisis, and Belaúnde's prestige was not increased by his enemies' exaggerations of the situation.

Inflation, devaluation of the sol and the growing national debt indicated economic mismanagement, and this often encouraged intervention.[1] Despite the steady growth in the early I960's, the economy began to falter by the mid-I960's and politico-economic crises loomed for the late I960's. In the "White Book" published by the RMG it was explained that intervention was necessary because corrupt politicians in Congress had failed to remedy the economic disruption.[2] The military could have been concerned about its budget allocation. Officers believed that the military had to be well equipped, and on 4th October I967 (exactly a year prior to the coup) I6 French Mirage fighter-bombers were purchased for $US20 million. This contributed considerably to Peru's $US I20 million deficit. Political adversaries though they were, President Belaúnde, APRA leader Haya de la Torre, and General Odría all agreed that the budget had to be balanced in I968.[3] The military might have predicted intolerable budget cuts regardless who occupied the presidency after I969.

A sixth reason for intervention could have been that General Velasco, who was approaching retirement age, might

1. (See Taylor; JIAS; Vol IX No I; January I967; pp 88 and Welch & Smith; I974; pp I9)
2. (Reported in New York Times; 2nd December I968; pp 74)
3. (Reported in the New York Times; 25th October, I967; pp I4)

General Manuel Odría,
President of Peru
1948 - 1956.

Fernando Belaúnde Terry,
President of Peru
1963 - 1968

General Juan Velasco Alvarado, leader of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces 1968 - 1975.

Hugo Blanco, guerrillero and peasant organizer.

have preferred to cap his career with the presidency rather than resign his commission. [1] Although General Pérez Godoy was removed in I962 after exceeding his retirement age, General Velasco appeared more in tune with the overall mood of the army than was his successor.

Finally, the military might have been protecting its reputation and prestige by intervening. A congressional committee was investigating a smuggling operation which might have implicated the military.[2] Since the ochenio of Odría, the military, especially the army, had sought to improve its image and protect its integrity by rejecting the oligarchy and by taking an active part in civic action programmes. Credibility and respect would be lost if the army were found implicated in illegal activities.

The citizens of Lima, the Peruvian capital, believed for months that a coup d'etat was imminent, but when the RMG made no announcement of elections (thus indicating a prolonged intervention) it was obvious that the military had its own long-term reasons for deposing Belaúnde. General Velasco later hinted that the smuggling scandals, the deadlocked Congress, the factionized political parties, a possible APRA victory in I969 and the IPC scandal were all purely coincidental.[3]

After the expropriation of the IPC facilities, the RMG seized foreign fishing boats, expelled US military missions and rejected the scheduled Rockefeller mission. Land owned

1. (Clinton; IAEA; Vol 24 No 4 Spring I97I; pp 46. Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-I97I; pp I00 and Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp I4)
3. (Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No 3; April I975; pp 40I, 404)
2. (Clinton; IAEA; Vol 24 No 4 Spring I97I; pp 46. See also Wales and Preston; IAEA; Vol 26 No 2 Autumn I972)

by the oligarchy and by foreign companies including W.R. Grace & Sons, was expropriated. Some land was partitioned and redistributed, whole plantations were turned over to co-operative control.

A new industrial law gave the State control over basic industries (steel, basic chemicals, paper, oil).[1] Investment and finance also came under State control.

Administrative reforms saw the abolition of some government departments and the creation of others.[2] Administration and planning were made more efficient when the Instituto Nacional de Planificación was overhauled. Centralization and bureaucratic method were emphasised. A National Development Plan for I97I-I975 was formulated, and a biennial budget drawn up.[3]

Several factors account for the military's refusal to return to constitutionalism, as in I963, and for the formal establishment of the RMG.

First was the influence of the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM, Centre for Higher Military Studies) and the new military thought. CAEM provided courses for mid and senior ranking officers and civilians. It taught lessons on national soverignty which was defined as a military obligation to increase Peru's capacity for maneuvre vis-à-vis the outside world and particularly the US. This was in accordance first with Article 2I3 of the I933 Constitution which charged the military with the defence of national

1. (see Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec. I972; pp 654; Welch & Smith; I974; pp I65)
2. (See below; Chapter VIII; pp 117)
3. (See Klitgaard; IAEA; Vol XXV No 3; Winter I97I; pp I0-I2)

soverignty,[1] and second with the growing anti-US sentiment of the military. Since defence was their major concern,[2] officers looked away from the US when it began to restrict its arms sales to Latin America during the mid I960's. Ideologically, the military felt no compulsion to side with US in the Cold War against USSR. Officers felt that the confrontation would not affect Peru and that the Cold War was merely super-power rivalry.

The CAEM also showed that Peru's security depended on the republic's own political and economic strength. It was evident from Peruvian history, and perhaps even from both the Vietnam and Six Day Wars that Peru would have to fight any war alone, since reliance on other nations was no guarantee of, or substitute for, national security. Since defence capability rested on political and economic strength, Peru would have to modernize her old political and economic systems if she was to increase her military power. In stressing this, the CAEM applauded Kemal Attaturk and Gamal Abdul Nasser, two military modernizers who faced and accepted the problems of modernization and security.[3] The Peruvian military had to follow the Turkish and Egyptian leaders' examples and modernize Peru. Lessons on land reform, taxation, foreign policy and industrialization, etc., at CAEM taught the officers much about the technical and administrative problems of modernization.

1. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 25)
2. (See above; Chapter VI pp 89)
3. (See Van Cleve; IAEA; Vol. 30 No. 4; Spring 1977; pp 41)

The failure of the civilians and the parliamentary system to achieve anything made the officers more certain that they would have to take the initiative. General Lindley López emphasised the need for officers to prepare for a new role in Peru.[1]

The official army journal Revista Militar illustrated the new military thought. Editions in the I960's, unlike those of the I940's and I950's were concerned about the military's image, and role in Peru. Revista also discussed internal subversion and guerrilla warfare. Articles even recognised the legitimacy of guerrilla objectives and suggested that alleviating the problems that made possible insurgency would undercut future guerrilla support.[2] Nationalist themes also appeared more frequently in the I960's.

The guerrilla campaign in the Andes during the mid I960's hardened military thought against civilian politics. In I967, while on a visit to US, General Edgardo Mercardo Jarrín told officials that development and subversion were directly related. Castro-communist agitators were publicizing to the Peruvian masses that only violent revolution, not reform could achieve justice. Anti-communism was insufficient, declared Mercardo, unless policies were directly related to economic development.[3]

Even those officers who were reluctant to re-enter politics after I963 were convinced of its necessity by I968. CAEM had long taught its students that civilians had failed

1. (The commission set up by President Prado in I956 to study agrarian and housing problems was one such failure. See Patch; AUFS; (WCSA) Vol IX No 4; April 1962; pp I5-I6; and Vol X No 1; July 1963; pp 4)
2. (North; I966; pp 52-53)
3. (Speech reported in Corbett; I972; pp I6. Einaudi; pp 4II in Chaplin; (ed) I976)

to develop Peru, but officers were influenced more by the Cuban experience, where officers were exiled, jailed or shot, and their own experiences and difficulties wiping out the Andean guerrilla fronts. In their minds the two experiences were not unconnected. The risk of renewed insurgency forced the military to become a development elite.[1] That the military could adopt such a role was not new in Latin America.[2]

Encouraging military thinking about change was the army's sympathy for the lower classes and Indian peasants. Officers believed that they understand and represent these less privileged groups. Although paternalist, these beliefs and views were never-the-less genuine, given the ethnic and social origin of many officers including General Velasco himself.[3]

Second, the military believed that its needs and wishes corresponded with those of Peru. Strong centralized government was one such common need.[4] Nor did many officers feel that it was in the best interests of the military and Peru for them to act as lackeys of traditional elites and repress change. Officers were contemptuous of its old allies the oligarchs who acted only in self-interest.[5]

Greater efficiency was another desirable goal for Peru and the military. Despite Peru's centrist tradition, her

1. (Astiz & Garcia; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec 1972; pp 678)
2. (See Malloy; JIAS; Vol 14 No 4 November 1972; pp 450)
3. (See Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS April 1971; pp 49, 55-57 and Einaudi; pp 402-403 in Chaplin (ed) 1976. See also table in Astiz and Garcia; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec. 1972; pp 680)
4. (See above; Chapter VII; pp 96-97)
5. (See Patch; AUFS; (WCSA) Vol X No 1; July 1963; pp 4-6; Welch & Smith; 1974; pp 158)

administrative capacity was weak,[1] but the RMG was to sidestep the issues of greater administrative, bureaucratic efficiency by setting up a virtual counter-bureaucracy of officers and técnicos (Technocrats). All decision making was done along military lines and civilian advisers were consulted as to means rather than ends.[2]

Time, and therefore a formalized government were necessary if the military was to strengthen State control, increase efficiency and consolidate the changes made. To facilitate these, the RMG introduced the Corporativist system and created Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS or National Social Mobilization Support System).[3]

As an institution of planners, the military long considered the lack of planning a major impediment to Peru's development. To the military, planning was an integral part of strong, efficient government. General Morales Bermudez, the Minister of the Economy in the RMG said that the State would fulfill a regulatory role in planning to make cohesive the State, private and co-operative sectors of the economy. All planning would be made in the Instituto Nacional de Planificación (INP or National Planning Institute) set up by the I962 junta.[4] The RMG's planning was also indicative of the support given to the regime by reformist nationalist parties and middle sectors,[5] and also

1. (Refer to Payne; I965; pp 233-235)
2. (See Fitzgerald; I976; pp 39-4I)
3. (See below; Chapter VIII; pp 117-118, 128-129)
4. (Interview by Oiga, March I97I, reprinted in Tulchin (ed) I973; pp 375-378)
5. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5; I970-I97I; pp I02)

confered on it a degree of legitimacy. Although extensive, RMG planning was not definitive, as it hoped for an unpromised high degree of foreign investment which would be controlled by the State. It was the RMG's intention that the Peruvian state should control 56% of internal investment by 1975. It was also hoped to reduce inflation, increase employment, achieve a 7.5% annual growth rate and complete land reforms all by 1975.[1]

Another concern of great significance to both Peru and the military was national unity. Dependent on the resources of a unified state for money, recruits and leadership, the military had always favoured a high degree of centralised State-controlled political and economic power. Regionalism and devolution were always anathema to the Peruvian military. Accordingly, the RMG centralized Peru's administration in Lima and halted the trend toward devolution begun by Belaúnde when he permitted local elections in 1963 and 1966. Local power or autonomy might create dissension with Peru, and even threaten the authority which Comando Conjunto held on regionally based units. Regional sentiment and insufficient control from Lima permitted, for example, the Arequipa garrison to raise frequently the standard of revolt.

In addition, by replacing the oligarchy as the economic patron of Peru, the RMG, as a truly National institution would be able to create a new nation-state. Peruvians could cease to be employees of the oligarchy and become active, enterprising citizens. As long as Peruvians felt little

1. (Klitgaard; IAEA; Vol XXV No 3; Winter 1971; pp 13-15)

loyalty toward their country, Peru would be weak, perhaps even "a mere geographic expression."[1] The guerrilla campaign taught the military that its civic action work could not only undercut guerrilla support, but also gain peasant allegiance to the State. Both the military and the enlightened citizenry were subject to xenophobia and nationalism, particularly where foreign dominance and competition in the economy were involved. IPC, WR Grace and Company, and Cerro de Pasco Copper Company were major foreign firms whose properties in Peru were later expropriated by the RMG. The Peruvian military gained the emnity of the US in 1962 when it prevented Haya de la Torre from gaining the presidency.[2] This hostility strengthened the nationalist cause in the military.

Because of Belaúnde's stand on the IPC question, the US cut or reduced its trade and aid to Peru in order to encourage a favourable settlement. This indicated clearly the dangers of a receptive colonial style economy being too dependent on one market. Economic nationalism grew among officers and técnicos who wanted an economically independent Peru. Of particular concern also to the military was the defence of Peru's natural resources, particularly petroleum.[3] This amounted to the conservation of Peru's heritage for the future.

Another matter worrying the military was Peru's dependence on the US for military equipment. In October

1. (See Plank; in Baily; (ed) 1971)
2. (See Van Cleve; IAEA; Vol. 30 No. 4; Spring 1977; pp 37, 39, 41-42)
3. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April 1971; pp 39-40)

1967, the airforce bought 16 French Mirage[1] but on 22nd January 1968, the US reiterated its disapproval of Latin American republics buying equipment which suited the needs of international rather than internal (guerrilla or civil) wars.[2] Miffed by the Mirage deal, the US halted military aid to Peru.[3] The US was obviously unreliable as a supplier of defence equipment on the world market.

Peru also needed a President accepted throughout the republic. The 1962 and 1963 elections shared not only electoral indecision but also highly regionalized political support.[4] In neither of these elections did the candidates obtain a nation-wide mandate. After 1966-1967, Belaúnde had lost the goodwill and popular support (including that of the military) which he had gained in 1963.[5] He had failed to satisfy an almost impossibly broad spectrum of political opinion. Officers believed that only they enjoyed the prestige and national outlook needed to provide effective leadership.

Domestic stability was an important goal to the military and Peru. Peasant discontent, land invasions and guerrilla insurgency were increasingly frequent during the 1950's and 1960's. The military hoped that agrarian reform would eliminate most peasant discontent. By creating a petit bourgeois class of peasant land owners the agrarian reform would offset the danger of a landless revolutionary proletariat.[6] The

1. (See above; Chapter VII; pp 98)
2. (See speech by US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara reported in IAEA ; Vol 21 No 4; Spring 1968; pp 89-92)
3. (New York Times; 17th May 1968; pp 1; and 21st August 1968 pp 9)
4. (See Neira; pp 463 in Guide to Political Parties in Latin America; 1973)
5. (See New York Times; 7th October, 1968; pp 2)
6. (Chaplin; JIAS; 1968; Vol X No 4; October; pp 565; Gitlitz JIAS; Vol XIII No 3 & 4; July-October 1971; pp 462, 467; Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5; 1970-1971; pp 105)

Industrial Communes would also create a conservative, property owning class of workers in the cities.[1] The military knew that change was inevitable in Peru and that resisting the irresistable would bring inevitable violence and revolution. This was unacceptable to the military and Peru. The lessons of Bolivia and Cuba were all too vivid. Under Article 213 of the 1933 Constitution, which declared that the purpose of the military was "to guarantee the rights of the Republic, the fulfillment of the Constitution and the Laws and the conservation of public order," the military felt that it had legal as well as practical justification for intervention.[2] Intervention then, was for the legal prevention of disorder and instability. Officers believed that if economic development was a source of security and integration of the nation and state, they were justified in using their technical and administrative capacity for Peru's future.[3] The RMG did not seek to inflame passions and give cause for violence. General Velasco himself prefered persuasion and compromise to coercion, often dealing personally with disputes.[4] The RMG prefered to reject repression and violence as political weapons and relied instead on keeping and nurturing public goodwill and acceptance.

Third, was the existence in Peru of a corps of civilian <u>técnicos</u> who were sympathetic to the military. After 1950, when the military-oligarchy relationship was weakening, new

1. (See below, Chapter VIII; pp 114)
2. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS April 1971; pp 33; Einaudi; pp 406 in Chaplin; (ed) 1976; EVK Fitzgerald; 1976;pp 39)
3. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 1970-71; pp 109)
4. (See Welch & Smith; 1974; pp 166 and Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 1970-71; pp 106)

links were forming between politically minded, activist officers and civilian administrators, intellectuals, professionals and technocrats. Some had trained at military schools and had even attended CAEM.[1]

Many officers and técnicos shared attitudes and values. They prided themselves on their management skills, efficiency and organization. Their success rested on competition and merit. Their interests were the preservation of middle class values and income, and of tradition and religion. Both officers and técnicos were opposed to mass politics, inflation and the redistribution of wealth.[2] Both disliked the corruption, greed, indecision and self-interest inherent in the existing system. By their expertise social responsibility and problem-solving ability they felt confident to lead change.

Initially the officers and técnicos supported Acción Popular, but with the failure of the Belaúnde government to enact change, they presented their own candidate for the I969 presidential election.[3] When the RMG was declared in October I968, many of these highly qualified and sympathetic civilians gave their support to it. Many of them were unemployed in the Belaunde years because they lacked the political and social contacts needed to get a job. The RMG, which found them employment by expanding the INP, became very much a civil-military technocracy.[4]

1. (Einaudi; pp 406 in Chaplin (ed) I976; Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 25; Corbett; I972; pp IO-II)
2. (Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec I972; pp 658)
3. (Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec I972; pp 652)
4. (Klitgaard; IAEA; Vol XXV No 3 Winter I97I; pp 9; Jaquette pp 42I in Lowenthal (ed) I975; Welch & Smith; I974; pp I70)

Forth was the need for a formalized government to help legitimize the coup d'etat. In I962, no such government was established because the military intended staying in power for only a very limited time in a caretaker capacity. For this purpose, the Comando Conjunto (Joint Chiefs of Staff) of four co-presidents was sufficient. In I968 the Comando Conjunto formed an all-military cabinet of nineteen officers who took up the ministerial positions previously held by civilians. The RMG replaced the civilian cabinet at the head of the State bureaucracy. Initially authority was to be exercised in the old way, through the State, not the military, but the RMG set up new organizations which tended to circumvent the State structures.

A formalized government would legitimize the intervention, and by its efficiency, legitimize itself. The military would be able to make changes and correct them during its tenure of power. The manifesto of the RMG, published at the time of the coup was synonymous with RMG legitimization. It declared that structural reforms were necessary to ensure efficient government and "a definite nationalist position."[1] The military would accept responsibility for government for an indefinite period.

Assumption of power by the military also seemed acceptable to the Peruvian electorate because, first, the RMG would provide welcome security and leadership at a time of uncertainty,[2] and second, its seizures of IPC and Californian tuna boats, disputes over compensation, and US

1. (El Peruano; 4th October I968, quoted in Jaquette; pp 42I in Lowenthal; (ed) I975; Marett; I969; pp 274-277)
2. (See Marett; I969; pp 249-25I)

hostility all appealed to Peruvian nationalism, and thus, probably ensured legitimization for the regime.[1]

Formalized government also affected the military as an institution. The RMG made unnecessary the use of a supreme leader who, by virtue of the prestige and power gathered around him becomes partially independent of the military, and may even hold the institution to ransom.[2] The RMG also dispensed entirely with figureheads who like Leguía, were difficult to control and might prove a liability. Nor could civilians project the values precious to the military of dedication, honesty, unity and nationalism.

It was not possible to set up a political party of officers and campaign for a constitutional mandate for power as Cáceres had tried to do in the I890's.[3] Direct and immediate intervention was necessary. The coup d'etat of October I968 abruptly ended Belaúnde's mandate and installed the RMG which obviated the need for political parties and public consensus. The unity and non-partisanship of the military during the coup helped ensure the apolitical nature of the new RMG.[4] Simple caution and distrust of popular initiative also figured in the RMG disavowal of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) which were set up by civilian supporters of the milita ry and later replaced by SINAMOS.[5] A formalized military government

1. (Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No 3; April I975; pp 4I2; Welch & Smith; I974; pp I69)
2. (See above Chapter VI; pp 85-86)
3. (See Pike; I967; pp I52-I58; and above; Chapter VI pp 90)
4. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5; I970-7I; pp I09)
5. (See Chaplin; pp I9; Einaudi; pp 407 on the influence of a I944 secret military lodge which emphasised military responsibility to Peru, and also Palmer and Middlebrook pp 430 in Chaplin (ed) I976)

operating according to military precepts of loyalty, solidarity and honour was also more likely to be resistant to civilian corruption and temptation than a *caudillo* government like that of Odría. In the RMG essential unity and co-operation were preserved by ensuring that all three service chiefs agree to the choice of first President, and that all three sign any government decree. Undoubtedly, the RMG was an institutional government whose actions and policies were formulated by military minds. However, the leadership which the RMG provided must be seen in the context of the Peruvian military.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERUVIAN MILITARY IN POWER

El Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada (Revolutionary Military Government - RMG) quickly gained a reputation for radical reform, populism and left-wing nationalism. This resulted from a dramatic campaign of expropriation, reform and rhetoric which was lauded by Latin American leftists including Pablo Naruda and Fidel Castro.

The first dramatic act was the expropriation of the $US200 million IPC installation in October I968. That same month, the RMG announced that there would be no immediate return to constitutionalism, although civil rights were restored in November. In February I969 the RMG announced the end of reliance on the US economy, and signed an accord with the USSR.[1] Peru seized Californian tuna boats poaching within her 200 mile territorial sea limits, expelled US missions, rejected the scheduled Rockefeller Mission and announced in June I969 a massive land expropriation and reform which included the exploration territories owned by the US, the W.R. Grace & Company, and the Cerro de Pasco Copper Company. In the early I970's, Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) were formed which seemed most reminescent of Castro's Cuba. The RMG also expropriated three commercial banks (two foreign and one local) thus nationalizing credit and further reducing foreign penetration and dominance of the economy. The RMG

1. (New York Times; 2nd February I969; pp 4 & I8th February I969; pp I)

was not intimidated by the economic importance or foreign ownership of big efficient enterprises, which were turned over to co-operative control.[1] Basic industries including sugar and petroleum were nationalized, and telecommunications and electricity were taken over, as were the railways. Foreign capital was excluded by decree from the fishmeal and cotton industries.[2] A new industrial law, Comunidad Industrial was announced which introduced worker participation in business. Workers would have a vested interest in their factories and would eventually own a 50% share through savings and investment of wages.[3] The RMG compared Peru with Cuba and China, thus enhancing its revolutionary and nationalist reputation.[4]

The RMG also gained a reputation by its rhetorical stand on humanism, social justice, social obligation, Christianity and welfare.[5] There was no attempt to coerce Peruvians or run Peru as a totalitarian state. There was no curfew, no mass arrests and only a limited censorship.

During the I970's, the RMG extended its land reform programme. Metallurgic industries including copper were nationalized, and more foreign fishing boats seized by the navy. Peru signed trade agreements with China, purchased Soviet arms and accepted Soviet credit to the tune of $US500 million.[6] In I974, the US Peace Corps was expelled, and Cuban workers took over the vacated jobs. When he

1. (See Jaquette; WPQ;Vol 25 No 4 Dec. I972; pp 655. Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-7I; pp I05)
2. (Fitzgerald; I976; pp 29)
3. (See Pearson; IAEA; Vol 27 No I; Summer I973; pp 26; Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec. I972 pp 663)
4. (Jaquette; pp 406-407 in Lowenthal (ed) I975)
5. (See Morales Bermudez interview reported in Oiga I2th March I97I in Tulchin (ed) I973. More detailed explanations of humanism, Christianity and welfare can be found in Drysdale and Myres; pp 26I,263 in Lowenthal (ed) I975)
6. (Time; I0th January I977; pp I4-I5)

declared that Peru was a revolutionary and not a socialist country, first-President Velasco enhanced the RMG's reputation for nationalism, State control and modernization.

Despite the many urgent social and demographic problems in Peru, the RMG concentrated chiefly on national and structural matters. Abolition of the old traditional oligarchy expropriating its land was one such vital structural change. By driving the oligarchy away from agricultural, export, primary produce industries such as planting and mining, by ending gamonalismo and by ruling without Congress, the RMG neutralized the oligarchy's negative and conservative influence on politics.[1] The oligarchy took an active part in politics, dedicating itself to parliamentarianism, federalism and prevention of the growth of State expenditure which would necessitate higher taxes. Greater State control of the economy and centralism were anathema to the oligarchy.[2] The oligarchy impeded progress in Peru by creating over the course of four centuries an instinctively cautious and negativist society which responded sluggishly to change. The break down of modernization in previous years could be partly explained by the continuance of hidden, persistent non-modern values.[3] Peru remained so dependent on the political and economic status quo that any attempt to modernize the system and reduce this dependence automatically threatened the republic's skewed prosperity. The system was incapable of reforming itself.

1. (The social, economic and political importance, and composition of the oligarchy and gamonalismo are explained in Payne; I965;pp 273-277; Bourricaud; SCID; Vol II No 2 I966. See also Glossary)
2. (See also Marett; I969; pp 257)
3. (See Germani; SCID; Vol V No 8 I969-70; pp I58,I69-I70)

The removal of the oligarchy as a political, economic, social and intellectual impediment to change, and its replacement by the State was a vital structural reform, but the plantations and mines, now under the control of State and worker run co-operatives, were still vital to Peru's economy. Although not able to reduce immediately this reliance on extractive industries the RMG tried instead to lessen Peru's dependence on any one market, particularly that of the US. Trade with Japan, China, USSR and East European countries was increased and economic co-operation was intensified with the Andean Pact countries.[1]

A vital aspect of non-modern values was the middle sector alignment and identification with the oligarchy. The middle sectors were usually conservative, conformist and even reactionary. They did not develop a separate identity or value system.[2] Destruction of the upper-class oligarchy might have made the Peruvian middle sectors more effective.

Accumulation of wealth and opposition to redistributive taxation also ensured oligarch dominance of the bureaucracy. By dispensing patronage, and appointing functionaries, the oligarchy made the bureaucracy corrupt, inefficient, and unreliable. State authority and official channels became a mockery.[3] By destroyi ng the oligarchy, the RMG could depoliticalize the bureaucracy, gain economic control of the country, reform the taxation system and industrialize.

The RMG created new entrepreneurial sectors - a Sta te

1. (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru & Venezuela. See Milenky; IAEA; I97I Vol 25; No 3)
2. (Marett; I969; pp 253; Chaplin; JIAS Vol X No 4 I968; pp 553-554; Nun; I969; pp 2I-26)
3. (Bourricand; SCID; Vol II No 2 I966; pp 27; Marett; I969; pp 255; Paulston; JDA Vol 5 No 3; I97I; pp 405; See also Chaplin; JIAS; Vol X No 4 I968; pp 550; and Payne; I965; pp 233-234)

sector controlling basic industrial development and production of raw material; a domestic private sector and a foreign sector, both of which would develop non-durable, consumer-product industries.[1] These entrepreneurial innovations would replace the oligarchy and stimulate modernization, development and investment by Peru's middle sectors. Rapid expansion of the State sector placed minerals, petroleum, transportation, power, exports, banking, communications, industry and housing all under State control. Three of the most important State enterprises were MINEROPERU, PETROPERU and EPSA, all established in I969-I970. All of these enterprises control prices and profit margins.[2] The state would also control and direct the level of foreign investment in the economy.

There was also a restructuring of government to facilitate efficiency, a Consejo Asesor de la Presidencia (COAP or Presidential Advisory Council) was set up to make policy. It comprised military chiefs and ministers. An all-military Consejo de Ministros or cabinet made administrative decisions while four main groups of agencies the Sub-Sector Publico Independiente were directly responsible to the relevant ministry and were divided mainly into general, security, economic and social departments.

Perhaps the most significant RMG plans for restructuring Peru were Corporativism and SINAMOS. Highly centralised, hierachic, vertically aligned, elitist, and dominated by top-down government initiative, the Corporativist structure

1. (See Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-7I; pp I08)
2. (See Fitzgerald; I976; pp 47-5I)

was not only a feature of the Hispanic political past, but also approximated military values and structure.[1] The corporativist model of government must have appealed to the military as the ideal form for the future of Peru, - a definite break with the old system. Government must be direct and positive.

To consolidate this model, enhance efficiency minimize conflict and channel popular expression, the RMG created SINAMOS in I97I. Operated from Lima, SINAMOS had agencies at departmental, provincial, union and community levels. Once called "a school for participation" in which government officials "taught" the citizenry, SINAMOS viewed popular participation as mere collaboration in local development, not decision making. Organization by (civilian and military) experts was the solution to Peru's structural and national problems.[2]

Unfortunately, the RMG neglected in part urgent social and demographic problems, some of which required immediate action because of the "lead time" they needed. Most of these problems were rural.

Despite expenditure and civic action programmes in the countryside building irrigation systems and teaching peasants, the agricultural production of individual peasants remained low. 5I% of the population was engaged in agriculture, but it contributed only I7.4% to the GNP.[3] Low food production meant food shortages, and Peru had to import food to prevent starvation. Production grew at 2.8% per year, but the

1. (See Middlebrook & Palmer; I975; pp 9-I0; 43; 46; Klitgaard IAEA; Vol XXV No 3; Winter I97I; pp 9-I0)
2. (See Palmer & Middlebrook; pp 438 in Chaplin (ed) I976; Middlebrook & Palmer; I975; pp I8-26;and above Chapter VII pp 103-104)
3. (Marett; I969; pp 228)

population was expanding at 3.02%. Agrarian reform was more likely to worsen this situation.

Nor was there sufficient land for all peasants under the I969 Land Reform which fixed the sizes of holdings.[1] The lack of la nd for all peasants, and many other problems were a result of a population explosion in Peru which threatened to nullify economic gains.[2]

Population growth, rural conditions and pressure on land forced peasants to migrate to the cities, particularly Lima, the population of which tripled between I940 and I96I. Entire slums grew around Lima. Population growth and migration exceeded new opportunities opening in employment and education.

Oviously, population growth was a major problem in Peru, but the RMG did nothing to encourage family planning. In fact, the RMG closed down a family planning unit set up on a trial basis by the Belaunde government.[3]

The old taxation system which relied mostly on import duties and internal, indirect taxation inhibited savings and investment. It also affected the lower classes more than the upper classes and big business.[4] Although the RMG occasionally threatened major tax reform, little or nothing was actually done. It did not use the income tax system to obtain much needed capital for State investment, or bring about a redistribution of wealth.[5]

1. (See Branco; JIAS; Vol IX No 2 April I967; pp 227,229, Patch; AUFS;(WCSA) March I964; Vol XI No 3; pp I3; Chaplin; JIAS; Vol X No 4; October I968; pp 566)
2. (See Patch; AUFS; (WCSA) Vol IX No 4 April I962; pp 35; Taylor; JIAS; Vol IX No I; January I967; pp 87; Alisky pp 29I, 292 in Burnett & Johnson (ed) I968)
3. (Clinton; IAEA;Vol 24 No 4 Spring I97I; pp 57; Chaplin; pp 24 and Doughty; pp 77 in Chaplin; (ed) I976; Sanders; AUFS; (WCSA) Vol XVII; No 6; April I970)
4. (See Taylor; IAEA; Vol 2I No 3; I967; pp 53-54)
5. (Jaquette; pp 423 in Lowenthal (ed) I975; Fitzgerald; I976; pp 44, 45, 47)

The inconsistencies and reforms of the RMG can be partially understood by examining the military base which influenced the course of events. The military which deposed President Prado in I962 wanted to take some part in modernization but was disinclined to domina te such a programme. It prefered a limited role in politics in order to regain and protect the prestige lost in the ochenio. Civic action appeared the most favourable means of military participation.

General Pérez Godoy lost the support of his military collegues in I963 because they were unwilling to follow the reformist lead he had set. The junta headed by General Lindley López was considerably more conservative and cautious.[1]

Military morale and confidence rose sharply during I966-I967. First the I962 junta had given the military a new reputation for integrity, honesty and efficiency. It had also refuted its old ties with the oligarchy. Second, participation in civic action programmes had increased the military's standing among the peasantry.[2]

Third, the quick, efficient and victorious conclusion of the counter-insurgency campaign justified to the enlightened public the military institution. Its mood became more assertive, and it gained Belaúnde's permission to buy French war planes. Forth, military confidence had

1. (Marett; I969; pp I88; Pike; I967; pp 302 and Chapter VI; pp 87. Although Lieuwen (I964) also credited Pérez Godoy with junta reform, Patch (July I963) disagreed and placed the responsibility for the reforms on Lindley López. See Lieuwen; I964; pp 3I; and Patch; AUFS;(WCSA) Vol X No 1; July 1963; pp 4-5)
2. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 54-55)

been nurtured also its training and experience in organization, planning and development.[1] The radical, impatient element hankering for change became disillusioned with President Belaunde first because of the down turn in the economy in I966, and second because of the slow rate of reform. It appeared that the President had no real intention or ability to change anything.[2]

As malaise overcame the Belaunde government, the military waited for an opportunity which would assure legitimacy if and when it intervened. That opportunity arrived in October I968 when the electorate rose in indignation at the IPC agreement. Nationalism appeared the stimulus for intervention, but the exact reasons remain speculative.[3] The mood of the milita ry however, was reformist, activist and nationalist. It was prepared to repeat and extend the achievements of the I962 junta.

The immediate need for the RMG was legitimacy which was satisfied for a time by the expropriation of the IPC. The military was never-the-less realistic: the cost of legitimacy might be the suspension of aid.[4] To assuage US feelings and discourage implementation of the Hickenlooper Amendment the RMG adopted a conciliatory and moderate policy. First, the RMG announced that it would give priority to Peru's

1. (Cotler: SCID; Vol VI No 5; I970-7I; pp II3)
2. (Jaquette; pp 432-433 in Lowenthal (ed) I975. An interesting personal impression of Belaunde Terry is contained in Patch; AUFS; (WCSA) September I962; Vol IX No 6; ppIO-II)
3. (See above; Chapter VII, pp 95-99)
4. (In I962 in the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, Governor Leonel Brizola expropriated the local ITT installations, and in consequent efforts to pressure President Goula rt to resolve the matter, US Senator Hickenlooper had placed in an aid bill an amendment which suspended aid to any country which expropriated US property)

chief problem - the refinancing of $US250 million debt due for repayment within eighteen months. The RMG would also balance the budget, restrain wage increases continue foreign payments, maintain the exchange rates and adhere to a plan for mining investment by Anaconda and the Cerro de Pasco Copper Company worth $US500 million.[1] The RMG also offered to pay compensation.[2] This indicated a most responsible, fiscally conservative, and traditional economic policy which should appeal favourably to the US as its Congress debated implementation of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The RMG also pledged eventual return to constitutionalism and democracy. This would encourage US recognition of the RMG and the continuance of aid to Peru.[3]

Second, the RMG implemented its own anti-Hickenlooper Amendment campaign. The expropriation of the IPC, which was a Canadian firm, was called a "unique" case in which the US should not be involved anyway. Peru appealed to other Latin American republics for moral support and welcomed the new Soviet ambassador and his trade delegation. There was no expropriation campaign, the RMG declared, but if the Hickenlooper Amendment was enforced, Peru would suspend debt servicing, freeze remittances to US and expropriate properties as she saw fit.[4] The US found itself dealing with a proud, responsible and determined government which threatened to radicalize if the Hickenlooper Amendment was applied.

1. (The Economist; I2th October I968; pp 22-25)
2. (New York Times; I4th October I968; pp 46)
3. (New York Times; 26th October I968; pp I5)
4. (See Olson; JDA; I975; pp 408-4I2 Vol 9 No 3 Also New York Times; 4th October I969; pp 49. Cotler; SCID; I970-7I; Vol VI No 5; pp I03)

Unfortunately, it was not until I970 that the US decided against invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment, but in the interrim the US had taken an attitude toward Peru of "active malevolence." While the US debated the Hickenlooper Amendment's application on Peru, it greatly reduced aid, credit, investment and trade during I968-I970. For two years Peru lived in a state of uncertainty and economic deprivation.[1] The two years of US Congressional indecision had the same affect as the Hickenlooper Amendment if it had been invoked at the outset. It had a drastic affect on the RMG and the military, because it strengthened the nationalist and radical element in the officer corps. Disagreements followed, and there were numerous resignations, purges, reassignments and promotions among officers.

Although there were numerous changes in the RMG and the ranks, the effect on policy was not easy to judge. Individual officers could not be categorized with accuracy as being conservative, moderate or radical. Officers' views could vary from one issue to another, and the military was naturally secretive about officer opinion especially where politics was involved.

It appears, however, that the radicalist, nationalist element managed to over come the more cautious, moderate, pro-US right-wing element in the corps.[2] First, the US attitude meant that the US and the moderates in the Peruvian military were unable to justify their moderation or restrain those officers who favoured the radical

1. (Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No3; April I975; pp 405-408)
2. (New York Times; 26th June I969; pp 4)

expropriations as envisaged in the anti-Hickenlooper Amendment.

Second, the military had to justify the I968 displacement and replacement of constitutional government continually to the Peruvian public. Unable to operate an economy efficiently because of the US sanctions, the RMG had to appeal to nationalism and use rhetoric and reformist activity to commend itself to the people.

Despite the radicalism, nationalism and fervour of the RMG, the public's acceptance of it remained tenuous. In I97I, strikes became prevalent and there were outbreaks of violence in provincial areas. The military was also worried about US subversion. The RMG attempted to minimize doubt and uncertainty and neutralize criticism. Controls were placed on the media during I969-I970. Newspapers were expropriated and even turned over to co-operative management. In I972, Pedro Beltrán, doyen of the oligarchy and editor of a leading Peruvian newspaper, "La Prensa", was arrested by the RMG. Officers feared that with the loss of prestige, credibility and public goodwill, the RMG's authority might come to rest on State terrorism and military coercive power. Opinion within the Officer corps diverged. Officers favoured either continued reform or cautious conservatism, either tighter government control, or a return to the barracks. In January I972 the military cabinet was reshuffled again.

Judging the RMG and its military base is difficult. First, military and bureaucratic secrecy impedes assessment and rhetoric confuses the goals and aims being sought.

Leftist jargon was common, for example, "changing the basic structures of society" and "we are soldiers and we are revolutionaries." The RMG could be fostering a true revolution or a crash programme of State directed modernization.[1] Second, the RMG is a dynamic and changing institution so that any judgment of it is of mere transient relevance.

A major influence on the RMG were military institutional concerns. Nationalism was one such influence. Military and civilian nationalists wanted to control and reduce foreign influence in Peru, especially in the economy. They felt that Peru should have greater control of her own national, raw resources.[2] The long predominance in the oil industry of the IPC aggravated the nationalists and the military. As early as I960, the Peruvian Comando Conjunto publically declared that the IPC was "harmful to national soverignty"[3]. In defending this national cause, the RMG actually accepted some of the anti-imperialist proposals of the early APRA.[4] Nationalism above all else most characterized the RMG.

Allied to nationalism was national security. During the mid-I960's, the army succeeded in locating and eradicating completely three guerrilla fronts, but it was very aware of the difficulty involved, that rural discontent could re-ignite insurgency and that had the guerrilla forces been stronger the army would have been hard pressed to

1. (Clinton; IAEA; Vol 24 No 4 Spring I97I; pp 58)
2. (This nationalism was not limited to Peru. See Corbett; I972; pp I8 on nationalism in neighbouring Bolivia)
3. (Einaudi; RAND; R-586-DOS; April I97I; pp 30; Olson; JDA; Vol 9 No3; April I975; pp 408-409)
4. (See Malloy; JIAS; I972; Vol I4; No 4; Klarén; I973; pp II3-II5; Clinton; JIAS; Vol XII No 2 April I970; pp 283-284)

contain them. No doubt the military was also aware of the US difficulties fighting the Vietcong. The army also learned how discontented peasants could respond to demagoguery.[1] Contact with the peasantry in civic action programmes and during the insurgency indicated that agrarian and social reform in the countryside could undermine guerrilla support. The RMG's rural strategy - building utilities, roads, irrigation systems and redistributing land, was to institute sufficient improvement and change as to prevent future insurgency.[2]

The military was also very concerned about its coercive strength. Peru remained dependent on extractive industries which had to be protected against armed invasion. A territorial dispute with Ecuador appeared resolved,[3] but border conflict could break out at any time with Brazil, Colombia or Chile. When Peru purchased another sixteen Mirage fighter-bombers in I970 (bringing her total Mirage strength to 32), the other republics began to rearm and modernize their forces.[4] An arms race began. In I974 the RMG acquired from the USSR 250 T-5 tanks and scores of anti-aircraft missiles. In I976 it bought 36 Soviet Su-22 bombers.[5] Although the RMG and the military were particularly concerned about Chile, they also believed that Peru needed a military machine respected by all her neighbours. An additional reason

1. (Some peasants imitated their hero Hugo Blanco, by wearing shoes and growing beards. See Huizer; I973;ppII9)
2. (Astiz and Garcia; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec I972; pp 682. Fitzgibbon; JIAS; Vol XII No 2; Apr.I970;ppI98-I99;Paulston; JDA;Vol 5 No 3; Apr.I97I;pp406.That the rural population was expectant of change was evident by their response to the back country campaigning of Belaunde Terry during the late I950's.See Marett;I969;ppI82-I83;208.Huizer;I973;ppI05-I08)
3. (Slaght; IAEA; I973; Vol 27; No2)
4. (New York Times; 7th June I970; pp I)
5. (Time; I0th January I977; pp I4-I5)

for arms purchases might have been to maintain military prestige, unity, co-operation and morale as political fatigue manifested itself among the officers.[1]

Conservatism, authoritarianism, centralism and caution which typified the military institution typified the RMG. Despite beliefs that the officers corps was a middle class institution, the prevalence of officers from "military" families indicated that military values and life styles were more attractable to officers than those of the middle class. Consequently, it was to the military rather than to the middle class that officers owed their loyalty, and institutional not bourgeois class matters concerned them most. Middle class influence on the RMG was low.[2]

The RMG did much to help the material well being of many lower class citizens, but it did nothing to enlighten them politically or socially. For example, while changes were made in education, there was no mass rural adult literacy campaign which would have qualified more people for the vote.[3]

The barriadas population of Lima, which might one day erupt like a Parisian mob, was accepted by the RMG as an insoluable problem. The RMG coöpted some prominent barriada members into government jobs, built schools, allocated funds and granted land titles. This made the barriadas dependent on the State.[4]

1. (See above Chapter II; pp 22-23)
2. (See Chaplin; pp 31 in Chaplin (ed) 1976; Einaudi; RAND; 1971; R-586-DOS; April; pp 56; Nun; 1969; pp17-21)
3. (Chaplin; pp 30 in Chaplin (ed) 1976; Webb; pp 117 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975)
4. (See below, Chapter VIII; pp 130; Marett; 1969; pp 242, 245, Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec 1972; pp 663; Collier; pp 159-160 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975 and Doughty; pp 105 in Chaplin (ed) 1976)

The RMG also ensured strong State control of development. Government técnicos were in complete charge of everything. They managed the Pueblos Jovenes (Young Towns) project set up in late I968. The locals who would benefit were excluded from planning and decision making. Their participation was limited to building footpaths, roads, dwellings, sewers, etc.[1]

Interventors and técnicos were appointed by the RMG to initiate the land reforms and set up the workers' co-operatives. Peasants and workers remained passive and uninvolved while the RMG initiated the changes, but when they tried to implement the reforms on their own initiative they were quickly suppressed.[2] The RMG permitted free elections to the co-operative directorates set up to administer the expropriated coastal plantations, but when APRA scored well, the RMG altered the rules to prevent APRA from gaining control. It also coopted willing APRA leaders, and jailed others in order to reduce their power in the co-operatives. In addition State representation on the directorates was increased.[3] The RMG even supported Communist labour organizations in order to undermine APRA - controlled unions.[4]

When the CDR's were formed by enthused supporters of the RMG in March I970, the RMG disavowed them and set up its own support organization, SINAMOS.[5] The RMG perceived an inherent conflict between full popular participation, and internal security. By organizing popular participation, SINAMOS would reduce pressure group, political party and foreign influences

1. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-7I; pp II0)
2. (See Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-7I; pp II0)
3. (Gitlitz; JIAS; Vol XIII No 3&4; July-Oct I97I;pp 463-464)
4. (Jaquette; pp 430 in Lowenthal (ed) I975)
5. (See above; Chapter VII; pp 104;and Chapter VIII; pp 118)

in Peru and facilitate harmony in conflict situations such as between employers and workers.[1] SINAMOS was hierachic, and centralized in Lima. Its top, responsible positions were filled by senior ranking officers. The RMG also believed that its control was justified by the identical interests of the military and the people of Peru.[2] SINAMOS could not have been expected to modernize Peru for its budget was no larger than that of the separate agencies it replaced.[3]

Partly to preserve its image of being "above politics" and partly to maintain social order, the RMG relied on the old clientele system of patron-client relations which permitted economic interaction between individuals of different social classes.[4] After I968, State bureaucrats replaced the oligarchy as dispensers of patronage. Class and status continued to dominate Peruvian society.

Military authoritarianism permeated the RMG. The military distrusted the initiative of others, and prefered to monopolise political as well as coercive power. This distrust and desire to dictate change were reflected in the creation of SINAMOS and in officers' fears that even peaceful reform movements could endanger security.[5]

Nor did the RMG redistribute the nation's wealth although it made several threats to do so. A major reason inhibiting the redistribution of wealth was the officers' respect for the principle of private property. The RMG certainly

1. (Palmer and Middlebrook; pp 448 in Chaplin (ed) I976)
2. (Middlebrook and Palmer; I975; pp I9-22)
3. (Bourgue and Palmer; pp 205 in Lowenthal (ed) I975)
4. (See Pike; I973; pp 29-3I; Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec I972; pp 660)
5. (Einaudi; pp 4I3 in Chaplin (ed) I976)

expropriated the oligarchy's land, but they received compensation in the form of bonds redeemable if invested in industry. The RMG also made capitalists of the barriadas squatters who were given title deeds for the land they occupied. Worker ownership was also a feature of the Industrial Commune system.[1]

Perhaps indicative of uncertain aims as well as of military institutional behaviour were RMG caution and pragmatism. These are not characteristic of planned activity. Indicative of RMG caution (and General Velasco's personal concern) was the General's talking to students who objected to a new law that made students pay for their secondary education. This law excluded the poor from education and the resulting discontent led to violence. After talking to the students, General Velasco accepted many of the modifications they proposed.[2] The RMG was cautious, and susceptible to pressure sufficient to overcome the reasoning for the original decision.

The RMG also circulated among interested groups its proposed laws and regula tions. The military knew that caution, compromise and opinion were vital if it was to survive in politics.[3] It concentrated on short-term problems because the military realized that it lacked the prestige and authority needed to force through long term solutions to new and traditional problems. To help relieve the shortage of administrators at local level and neutralize

1. (See above; Chapter VIII; pp 114)
2. (Cotler; SCID; Vol VI No 5 I970-7I; pp I06. Welch & Smith; I974; pp I65-I66)
3. (See Einaudi; RAND; RM 6048 RC; May I969; pp II-I3. Jaquette; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4 Dec I972; pp 663)

dissent, the RMG actually coöpted some of its critics into responsible government positions. A successful case of coöption by the RMG was the appointment to SINAMOS of the imprisoned guerrilla leader Héctor Béjar. Attempts to persuade Hugo Blanco to take a job were less successful.[1]

The 1969 Agrarian Reform which was a vital necessity was an electoral goal of the Acción Popular-Democristiano coalition.

The 1969 Agrarian Reform was a pragmatic innovation. It was a vital neccessity and in step with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America[2] and Acción Popular-Democristiano goals. There was widespread acceptance in Peru for reform. Major land owners like the sierra gamonales and the Cerro de Pasco Copper Company were under increasing pressure in the 1960's to give land to the landless peasants who were invading their properties with evergrowing frequency. Knowing that the peasants could not be denied land for much longer, the RMG coopted into the Agrarian Reform programme Edgardo Seoane who was Belaunde's former "agrarian expert."

The Industrial Commune reform of the RMG was planned by Héctor Cornejo Chávez the Democristiano leader, but never implemented by the Belaúnde government.[3] It appears that the RMG was often only enforcing or implementing laws passed by earlier governments, and that although it was concentrating on immediate problems it expected long term programmes to take until 1990 to complete.[4]

1. (See Blanco; 1972; pp 15)
2. (See Ramírez Gomez; SCID; Vol II No 8; 1966)
3. (Jaquette; pp 427 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975)
4. (Benton; Conflict Studies; 1970; pp 11. Cotler; pp 70 in Lowenthal (ed) 1975)

The RMG was nationalist and pragmatic and made decisive changes in the internal economic structure of the country. Rather than breaking with the past and building a new society, the RMG acted within the context of the Peruvian situation and tended to re-affirm tradition. The range of reforms and innovations have exceeded the more superficial and material improvements made by previous Peruvian military governments but as usual, the military in power thought only in institutional terms, responded only to institutional concerns and provided only what it considered necessary or best for the country.

How the Peruvian case appears in the context of Latin American militarism and how it compares with the Brazilian case will be the matters for consideration in the final chapter.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Militarism as defined in Chapter I does not effectively summarize or explain the violence and instability of Latin American political life. An important feature of militarism in the European context was the high degree of international conflict and tension which made national security, nationalism and the military vital public concerns. By comparison, the Latin American region has been relatively free of international conflict and tension, with most disputes, particularly over border lines, being solved peacefully by diplomatic action. Only two small republics, El Salvador and Paraguay ever experienced militarism as defined in this work.[1] In Latin America, the military is recognised as being a principal subsystem of the entire political system with a constitutional role to play. It operates within the system, and is not excluded from it, or from participation in decision making.[2]

Despite attempts to exclude the military from politics, it has been too important to reject completely. Military schools have trained civilians. Officers have held high public office, and have headed many commercial and industrial enterprises. Frequently civilians have asked officers to intervene in politics on their behalf. The military has also evicted squatters, suppressed dissent, crushed strikes and removed unwanted governments. It has also participated

1. (See above; Chapter I; pp 5; and Corbett; 1972; pp 3-4)
2. (Rankin; LARR; Vol IX No I; Spring 1974; pp 81)

in varying degrees to national development and social reform. In general, Latin American militarism involves interference in public affairs, and the displacement and - or replacement of incumbent regimes.

The 1960's mark an important turning point in the military's involvement in the political system. The military junta in Peru during 1962-1963 proved to be a prototype for new styles of intervention in Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil. The military institutional component contrasted with that of the 1920-1961 period. Officers were very confident of their ability to govern their countries and they pledged their careers and prestige on future success. They believed the military to be the sole national repository of progress, patriotism and honesty. National and developmental problems could be solved by a military government applying military experience, ability and technology to planning, simulation and administration.

The motivational component also contrasted with the past. Intervention was stimulated by a military, political ideology or doctrine of "national objectives" thought out in the advanced military colleges. Military education generally has improved greatly since World War II and has increased officers' perceptions of national problems and their administrative abilities.

Improvements in primary and secondary education have facilitated greater social diversity in the officer corps. Cadets tend to be lower-middle class and urban, and this accentuates reformism among officers.[1]

The Latin American military has never been so professional. It fulfils the three conditions of professionalism (expertise, responsibility and corporateness) as expounded by Huntington.[2] Never-the-less, the Latin American military remains conservative and distrustful of others. Anti-individualist, the military favours the nation-state as the ultimate political institution and that it must be ready to meet any threat to internal and external security. Promotion by merit and competence are considered vital. Expenditure on armament is as important as expenditure on salaries.

Professional officers saw civilian political life as unpredictable, corrupt and indecisive. Politicians and bureaucrats often used patronage to advantage and favoured weak state power as they worked toward personal, material goals. Occasionally politicians tried to undermine military discipline, unity and neutrality by fomenting interservice conflict. The professional military, as a separate, elitist institution came to dislike the political system of which it was part, and sought to protect itself, first by

1. (See Ropp; IAEA; Vol 24 No 2; Autumn I970; pp 35)
2. (Huntington's thesis (I957) that professionalism led to an apolitical military has long been discredited by Finer (I962) and the facts. See Corbett; I972; pp 4; Welch and Smith; I974; pp 20 and Waymen; I975; pp I5-I6)

stressing its autonomy, and second by seeking modernization and reform.[1] By the I960's, the overt manifestations of intervention reflected professionalism. Generals, not jefe officers led the military into politics and they now chose to exercise power through an impersonal, institution-bound junta comprising the joint chiefs of staff.

A deep sense of urgency pervaded both civilian society and the military in Peru and Brazil during the I960's. Both countries were experiencing growing social unrest, political violence, economic uncertainty and weakening government. Urban and rural masses were mobilizing, and guerrilla insurgency seemed immenent. The feeling grew that the status quo could not prevail against rising forces and new challenges. The revolution in Cuba in the I950's was a clear indication of what could happen when a country was unable to respond to new and increased demands for political and social justice. By the early I960's both Peru and Brazil had come to doubt and distrust the efficency of their political systems. Their doubt was manifest in both the enlightened citizenry and the military.

The urgency increased military disposition to intervene in both countries. Brazilian officers conditioned by ESG teaching and the FEB experience felt that Brazil could be a

1. (See Maingot; pp 353 in Tulchin (ed) I973)

future world power if she could recover economic strength and proscribe Communist influence.[1] Peruvian officers were encouraged to intervene by the twin successes of the I962-I963 junta and the anti-guerrilla campaign of the mid-I960's. These successes and the failure of the Belaúnde government in the "last civilian chance to initiate change" showed that the military would have to take the lead.[2] The Peruvian military had already formulated an ideology or doctrine prior to the intervention. While precise goals were not clear, pragmatism, nationalism and humanism were acknowledged principles.[3]

By I966, the officers had lost confidence in President Belaúnde, but they tolerated him until October I968 when the IPC controversy har dened military opinion in favour of a coup d'etat. Only eight army officers in strategic positions made the actual decision to depose Belaúnde, but they knew in October that they had the support they had lacked for two years.[4]

Not anticipation, but desperation activated the coup d'etat of I964. Soldiers had not taken part in the I963 and I964 mutinies, but it was only a matter of time before the army, too would factionize. When President Goulart made his speech to the sergeants on 30th March I964

1. (see Jaguaribe; SCID; Vol II No 4; I966; pp 67)
2. (see Eina udi; I969; RAND; RM 6048 RC; pp I5,I6)
3. (General Morales Bermudez, Minister of the Economy, interview reported I2th March I97I in Tulchin; pp 375-378; (ed) I973)
4. (Cotler; pp 58 in Lowenthal (ed) I975; Einaudi; pp 403, 4I2 in Chaplin (ed) I976)

it was clear that he was encouraging factionism in the army. Factionism in the countryside was also growing during Goulart's presidency. Communist agitators from Hungary and China were believed to be active fomenting unrest among Brazil's discontented popula tion.[1]

Institutional preservation prompted the Brazilian coup d'etat of I964, while developmentalist aims and reform stimulated that in Peru four years later.[2] The different reasons for intervention resulted in the two different aims of the SRC and the RMG.

To the military there were legal obliga t ions to intervention. In the Peruvian Constitution of I933, Article 2I3 Title I2 declared that the military had to guarantee the rights of the republic[3] which were comprised by Peru's neo-colonialist status in the international economic order. The Talara agreement and the missing page eleven conflicted with the republic's rights under the Constitution. Articles I76 and I77 of the Constitution of I946 obliged the Brazilian military to obey the President only within the limits of the law and to defend the Constitution, Law, and order.[4]

Despite attempts to retain democratic traditions, the SRG ran Brazil in a conservative manner typical of Latin American military governments. The Officers halted reform movements and suppressed critics, liberals and leaders. They accepted, protected and strengthened those people and

1. (Worcester; I973; pp 225)
2. (Rankin; LARR; Vol IX No I; Spring I974; pp I00)
3. (Einaudi; RAND; R586DOS; April I97I; pp 33)
4. (Stepan; I97I; pp I04-I05)

institutions harmed by the political, economic and social instability of the Goulart presidency. The SRC took a firm inflexible hold of Brazil, protecting the rights of private property against the assault of social equality, redistribution and expropriation.

In Peru, the RMG expanded social welfare programmes, improved labour laws, built roads, expropriated private property, instituted worker participation in industry and mobilized the population in construction projects. On closer examination of these achievements the conservatism of the RMG becomes evident. The peasants who benefitted from the land reform had to pay the State for their land. Nor was there any major redistribution of wealthier or political power, and the principles of private property and compensations were not rejected. Despite the expropriation of the IPC, nine other foreign oil companies were able to strengthen their position in Peru, and foreign investment continued to be welcome.[1] The "social work" undertaken by the RMG was typical of previous military governments under Benavides and Odría.

Both military governments were authoritarian. Both minimized popular participation in decision making and dictated to their citizens what the military felt was in their best interests. The RMG established new institutions and proceedures which would supposedly benefit Peru in the future.

1. (Werlich; Current History; February I977; pp 62; Quijano I97I; pp II5; Astiz and Garcia; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4; December I972; pp 680, 682, 683; Cotler; pp 65 and Webb; pp I24 in Lowenthal (ed) I975)

The SRC felt initially that a short period of tutelary military rule was necessary. Both governments wanted to end the mercenary and corrupt politics of their civilian predecessors.

The RMG appealed to Peruvian nationalism. First, the military had no reason to subordinate their nationalism to friendship with the US, which had cut off arms sales to Peru[1], and had supported APRA in two Presidential elections.[2] US neglect of Bolivia, which had fulfilled the preconditions set by the Alliance for Progress, convinced the Peruvian military that US friendship was not to be relied upon. Second, nationalism and the expropriation of the IPC helped legitimize the coup d'etat and the RMG. This was a vital issue since the public's willingness to comply with RMG rule would ensure greater efficiency, good relations and national unity.

As a result of the FEB experience, friendships between US and Brazilian officers, Brazilian officers' satisfaction with capitalism and finally, tradition, the SRC suppressed nationalism in favour of friendly US relations. Siding with the US in the Cold War against all forms of leftism, the SRC denounced its critics and enemies as Communists and continued with the traditional "unwritten alliance." Hemispheric security and US investment were vital to Brazil's future.[3] The pro-US (and the unpopular) economic policies, the

1. (Einaudi; RAND; R586DOS; April I97I; pp 3I)
2. (Van Cleve; IAEA; Vol 30; No 4 Spring I977; pp 37, 39, 4I-42; Patch; AUFS (WCSA) Vol IX No 6; September I962 pp I6-I7)
3. (See Burns; I966; pp I60-I80; Corbett; I972; pp I3; Stepan; I97I; pp 239-244)

betrayal of public confidence in the moderator role and hardening political control all deprived the SRC of legitimacy. Public dislike, anger, frustration and discontent with the SRC necessitated suppression which created more dislike, anger frustrations and discontent.

National security, a professional military concern motivated the military governments to increase defence expenditure and strengthen State control of the nation. Army intelligence taught the Peruvian military that subversion and insurgency were effects of underdevelopment on a nation-wide scale. Officers were very concerned about the "latent state of subversion" in Peru whereby communists - or any other foe, internal or external - could exploit national weaknesses (as in the War of the Pacific). The officers' definition and range of "national weaknesses" were vast and all-embracing.[1] Subsequent RMG plans were intended to redress these weaknesses.

Not a concern to the Peruvian officers was military unity. The collapse of discipline and efficiency were not envisaged since APRA had moderated so much since the I940's. An APRA government was still undesirable because the party still threatened military political influence and coercive power.

The I935 communist uprising, the Cold War and Castro all created anxiety among Brazilian officers about domestic and external security. Peasant organizations and labour unions

1. (Einaudi; pp 4I0-4II in Chaplin; (ed) I976; Cotler; pp 49 in Lowenthal (ed) I975)

were proscribed as latent threats to Brazil. The long Atlantic coast, vulnerable since the Dutch invasions of the I7th century, had to be guarded against Cuban infiltration.

Firm, confident and decisive government was necessary also to deter foreign pressure, especially from Argentina. Eventually both the SRC and RMG increased expenditure on defence. Officers in both the Brazilian and Peruvian military received new promotions, pay increases and even decorations. These improvements made to individual careers were routine, as well as ensuring continued loyalty and unity, but in general the military increased its share of the budget for equipment rather than for personal aggrandizement.[1]

Essential differences appear on the military governments' emphases. The RMG concentrated on modernization and reform, making structural, institutional changes to Peru so that society and economy would relate to Peruvian interests. The intention was to rid Peru of her semi-colonial status and permit her to become a modern state co-existing on equal terms with the whole world. The RMG envisaged a "completion" date of reform and modernization of I990. The SRC emphasised development, - building factories, increasing production, exploiting raw resources, extending communications and exporting finished goods.[2]

Officers were satisfied with Brazil's institutional

1. (See Astiz and Garcia; WPQ; Vol 25 No 4; Dec. I972; pp 684; Burns; I97I; pp 372; Stepan; I97I; pp 223,269; and New York Times; 7th June I970; pp I)
2. (See above, Chapter I; pp5-6; Cotler, pp 70 in Lowenthal (ed) I975)

set up and her relations with foreign capital. Expansion and development within the existing framework took precedent over reform and social welfare.

Tradition and outlook dictated the emphases. First, national development was an old Brazilian military pastime. The expeditions of General Rondon were typical of the role the military had played in exploration, communication and education.[1] Brazil had long been aware of its great, unexplored and unexploited wealth, and that it had the potential to be a world power. Although Peru was also aware of her own wealth, the difficulty and cost involved in explora tion, communications and development all retarded an outlook like that of the Brazilian military.

Second, Brazilian officers had long experience and contact with industrial and commercial sectors. Frequently they held very high positions in private enterprises.[2] The officers were therefore very familiar with developmentalist institutions and were themselves loyal practitioners of capitalism. This contrasted with the poor contacts Peruvian officers had with commerce. Of 630 top positions in Peruvian business, only 4 were held by officers in I963. Consequently Peruvian officers had little business or financial skill, and experience and contact with commercial and industrial sectors was slight. In its proud association with the people, the

1. (See Nunn; JLAS; Vol 4 No I; I972; pp 36)
2. (See Johnson; I974; pp 2II-2I2)

Peruvian military rejected the oligarchy and plutocracy.[1]

Third, in taking a benevolent attitude toward the lower classes, the RMG expressed officers' concern about their fellow countrymen. Seventy percent of army officers came from the sierra and the coast (excluding Lima) and after taking part in the anti-insurgency campaign, they had plenty of personal contact with peasants, workers and "small" businessmen. Radical Christian thought was also evident among officers.[2]

Brazilian officers usually came from urban areas, but despite the high rate of urban drift they did not have first hand contact with the masses. Popular discontent and revolutionary potential were much more abstract, distant and hypothetical concepts to Brazilian officers than they were to Peruvian military men. This is evident from the Brazilian officers' fear of populism, labour and peasant unions and from past Peruvian military governments' preparedness to "look after" the lower classes, especially in urban areas. Certainly the level of control exercised in Brazil by the SRC was much greater than that of the RMG in Peru.[3]

Military education conditioned the two military institutions, especially in the post World War II period. The CAEM established in Lima in I950, taught senior ranking officers that institutional modernization was necessary to ensure national soverignty whereby Peru gained "room" to act

1. (Einaudi; RAND; R586DOS; April I97I; pp 42-43, 54-57)
2. (Drysdale and Myers; pp 263 footnote; in Lowenthal (ed) I975)
3. (See Wayman; I975; pp II-I3)

in the international system.[1] The ESG in Rio de Janeiro showed its officers that national security and national development were inseparable issues. Economic output had to be rationalized and maximized, national disunity minimized.[2] Both academies stressed old themes of order and control.

The two military governments earned themselves each a distinctive yet complimentary reputation. The SRC was labelled "liberal-internationalist" because of its adherence to democratic methods of government and its non-nationalist policies which accepted US and foreign investment in the economy. The RMG became known as "authoritarian-nationalist" because of its rejection of democracy and its nationalist desire to take control of its own economy while ignoring the admonitions of international finance.[3]

Despite the reputation of the SRC, many Brazilian officers disagreed with the stand taken and the policies adopted. They prefered a more assertive nationalist policy and the complete suspension of the I946 Constitution. They felt that the military should take total control of Brazil. The promulgation of Institutional Acts indicated that circumstance was forcing the liberal-internationalists toward illiberalism. The nationalist linha dura officers gathered around President Costa e Silva, and in December I968, two months after the Peruvian coup, they were able to force an authoritarian-nationalist solution on Brazilian military politics. An obvious difference between the two military regimes by

1. (See Einaudi; RAND; R586DOS; April I97I; pp 25
2. (Stepan; RAND; R 586 DOS; April I97I; pp 82, 85)
3. (See Corbett; I972; pp I3-I4)

December I968 was that the Peruvian military had given civilian government "one more chance" in I963, and then replaced it completely, but in Brazil, the military tried to work with civilians - a situation which became gradually less tenable as time went by and unrest grew. Both Peru and Brazil were considered (along with Guatemala) "moderately democratic" during the I945 - I960 period,[1] and both experienced together the "transitional or intermediate category" interventions of I962 and I964, respectively. In I968, within two months of each other, Peru and Brazil experienced new institutional military governments which broke with the old styles, but neither acted without precedent: Argentina in I966 and Bolivia and Panama both in I968 gained new style military governments. In each case civilians were excluded except in an advisory capacity. Military men took over all positions of responsibility, refused to promise elections and proceeded to rule their countries according to a doctrine of "national objectives" thought up in superior war academies. Military initiative, discipline, expertise, confidence and responsibility were prodominant themes in government.[2]

Frequently the new interventionism has been called nasserismo, but this term is not really applicable. In contrast to the Egyptian case, Latin America was more highly developed, and popular mobilization too far advanced for the

1. (Johnson and Burnett; pp 5I3-5I5 in Burnett & Johnson (ed) I968)
2. (See Mignens; SCID; Vol VI No I; I970-7I; pp 7-I2)

military to make the same dramatic improvements to the situation. Nor did Latin America have the same immediate colonial experience of Egypt. Rational organization of institutions, not technical innovations were needed.[1]

The two military governments signified major changes in Peruvian, Brazilian and Latin American militarism, but these changes do not signify a revolution. Both governments were constrained by institutional conservatism, caution and authoritarianism so that changes made in the interest of national security did not mean radical changes for society. The RMG did make important innovations in modernizing Peru so that she related in more equal terms to the international economic and political system, but neither government improved the plight of their peoples. Both relied more on time plus modernization and development to solve national social problems. Political control and stability were the governments' main priorities.

The militarism of intervention and interference in civil-military relations has not died out in Latin America, rather its nature has changed from personalist, reactionary and predatory to institutionalist and progressive.

Regardless what one may think of militarism, it is likely to continue in Latin America as long as the military sees itself as harbingers of change and nationalism in ba ckward, underdeveloped republics. That the military should take responsibility for solving the awesome problems which

1. (Nun; I969; pp 6I)

beset the republics is a testament to its sincerety. Never-the-less, world criticism is often emotive, often valid, but one may hope that the military in Peru and Brazil will find the subtle balance between their own interests and those of their people.

GLOSSARY

AP

Partido Acción Popular (Popular Action Party) AP was formed in 1956 by Fernando Belaúnde Terry who led it in the 1956, 1962 and 1963 elections. It was a loosely organized party and was reformist and technocrat in ideology. (See Guide to the Political Parties of South America; 1973; pp 424-440)

APRA

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) APRA was formed during the 1920s to challenge the dictatorship of Augusto Leguía. It was an elitist party, tightly organized, highly disciplined and led throughout its existence by Haya de la Torre. Support came from those areas depressed by the oligarchic and foreign monopoly of land, water rights, commerce, etc. particularly in the north coast of Peru where the big sugar and cotton plantations are located. APRA was continentalist, reformist and socialist in ideology and aimed to proscribe the military when it came to power. As a result of these policies, APRA was frequently banned from political activity. In response, its followers resorted to terrorism. As Haya matured from firebrand radicalism to pragmatic conservatism, so did APRA. Haya's integrity as a leader, democrat and politician is often doubted. (See Klarén; 1973; Clinton; JIAS; Vol. 12 No. 2; April 1970; and Guide to the Political Parties of South America; 1973; pp 401-422)

Barriadas

Squatter settlements.

CAEM

Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (Centre for Higher Military Studies) Set up in the 1950s in Lima, the CAEM aimed to teach non-military, developmentalist subjects to jefe rank officers seeking promotion to general rank. It related national and defence matters. Select civilians could also attend, but although the CAEM had a reputation for merit in its academic assessment, it tended rather to reinforce institutional characteristics such as discipline and conformity. (See Astiz and Garcia; WPQ; Vol. 25 No. 4; December 1972)

Caudillo

Personalism and charismatic leadership characterizes the caudillo. The coercive power he holds, and the authority he enjoys over a specific group or area are more significant than any military rank he might have. Caudillismo is not unique to Latin America since it can exist in any country where personalism has had to compensate for the lack of state organization and established proceedures for the transfer of power. (See Maingot; pp 66-73 in Tulchin; ed; 1973; Stokes; WPQ; September 1952; Vol 5 No 3; pp 447-450 and Lambert; 1967; pp 155-162)

Cholo

A person of black (negro) and Indian ancestry.

Comando Conjunto

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprising the heads of all the armed forces. One of these officers, usually a soldier, is appointed Chairman, and it is usually this officer who leads the military-junta government.

Coronel

To form a counter force against the regular army in Imperial Brazil, Emperor Pedro I commissioned specific fazendeiros as coronels (colonels) This legitimized the fazendeiros' private armies which now constituted a civil guard to be used in service of the monarch. It also accentuated regionalism. So many fazendeiros were appointed coronels that the two terms became virtually synonymous.

Coup d'etat

This is a skillful military operation to overthrow a government, and requires consummate military unity, discipline, leadership and planning. Often coups are bloodless, as in Peru in 1962 and 1968, Brazil in 1964 and Pakistan in 1977. (The most significant work on the coup d'etat is Luttwak; 1969)

Creole

A white, European person born in Latin America who is without Indian or black ancestry. The term also infers upper class, oligarch status.

DC

Partido Democratica Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party, or Democristiano) This party was formed in 1955 as a platform for ex-President Bustamante who had been deposed seven years previously by General Odría. In 1963, led by Héctor Cornejo Chávez, the DC joined the AP and successfully campaigned for power. In the alliance, the DC is nationalist, statist and moralist. (See Guide to the Political Parties of South America; 1973; pp 440-443)

ESG

Escola Superior de Guerra (Higher School for War) Set up in Rio de Janeiro in 1949, the ESG trained officers for promotion to senior, general rank. It also taught select civilians. An essential aim was to relate together national and developmental policies. (See Stepan; 1971; pp 245-247)

Estado Nôvo

(New State) Declared by President Vargas in 1937, the Estado Nôvo was supposed to represent a Brazilian fascist state.

Fazendeiro

Land or plantation owner in Brazil. They produced coffee and sugar for export and formed the imperial, economic oligarchy of Brazil. The fazendeiros exercised control over large areas and dominated local politics. Their politico-economic status was protected by their private armies of retainers which were sanctioned by the Imperial government.

FEB

Fôrça Expedicionária Brasileira (Brazilian Expeditionary Force) It entered the war in 1944, and fought in the Italian campaign under the command of US General Mark Clark. The 44,000 man contingent, which also included airforce units, fought with distinction against the Nazis. The FEB experience greatly inflenced Brazilian military attitudes towards the US.

Gamonal

Land owner in the sierra of Peru. The gamonals were the 'poor' oligarchy whose lands, though poor, were coveted by the

landless peasants. Gamonales (also called caciques) were significant not for their social or economic wealth but for the political control they had over their regions and for the support they could give to the government in Lima. (See Lambert; 1967; pp 153-155. How a politician with a strong local base could project himself onto the national stage and make his presc ence felt there, see Chester, Hodgson and Page; 1969; pp 268-269, 272-275)

Hacendado

Landowner. His power and authority usually extended beyond his own landholdings.

IPC

The International Petroleum Company. Registered in Canada, IPC was a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

Legitimacy

A government has legitimacy when the people accept it and acknowledge its right to hold power. If a government lacks legitimacy, it must rely on surveillance and force to remain in power, or leave office. It is the essential difference between government by authority and government by power.

Mestizo

A person of creole and Indian ancestry.

Mulatto

A person of creole and black (negro) ancestry.

Oligarchy

This term usually refers to a republic's upper class, the 'forty families' or 'ten clans' etc. which dominate all political, economic and social life. The oligarchy takes an active part in politics, seeking first, to limit State expenditure (which necessitates higher taxes), second to prevent an increase in internal demand (and the concomitant demand for a redistribution of wealth) and third, to prevent inflation which might necessitate devaluation and financial 'controls'. Free trade and laissez faire economic policies which benefitted the oligarchy as a planter, miner exporting class might be ended. (See Payne; 1965; pp 272-277;

Bourricaud; SCID; Vol II No 2; 1966; pp 26;)

Pronunciamiento

This refers to a specific method of overthrowing a government. Military units in the periphery of central authority announce their rejection of that authority. To re-impose its authority over the mutineers, the central government must dispatch troops. The pronunciamiento succeeds when the 'loyalist' units refuse to obey their orders to march against their fellow soldiers and instead overthrow the government which gave those orders. In this way, civil war is avoided. (See Luttwak; 1969; pp 24-25) The pronunciamiento is indicative of regionalism, poor military loyalty toward its master and employer, the State, but strong loyalty to itself.

Putsch

This is a form of direct intervention whereby military units acting on their own, attempt to seize power in a manner akin to the coup d'etat. However, the putschists' decision to act is made spontaneously and recklessly without organization or planning. The putschists hope that surprise will compensate for poor coördination, lack of support and any tactical failure. Hopefully, troops uninvolved in the putsch, and able to resist it, will accept the fait accompli situation. The putsch is indicative of poor military discipline and ambitious commanders, and as a crude form of intervention, is rarely successful.

There is a semantic aspect to the putsch. Commentators who, for partisan reasons disapprove of an intervention will call it a 'putsch' which has mercenary connotations, but if they approved of it, they frequently call the intervention a 'revolution' which seems more justified, more noble and more 'popular'.

RMG

The Revolutionary Military Government, an abbreviation for El Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada (Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces)

UNO

Unión Nacional Odriísta (National Union of followers of Odria) The personalist party of General Odría, UNO was a conservative but pro-worker party regionalised in the North where Odría was remembered for his personal courage in the war with Ecuador in 1941, and in Lima where workers remembered his rhetoric and the public works programmes which provided employment.

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Abbreviations

AUFS	American Universities Field Studies Report
ECSA	East Coast South America Series
HAHR	Hispanic American Historical Review
IAEA	Inter-American Economic Affairs
JDA	Journal of Developing Areas
JIAS	Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs
JLAS	Journal of Latin American Studies
LARR	Latin American Research Review
SCID	Studies in Comparative International Development
WCSA	West Coast South America Series
WP	World Politics
WPQ	Western Political Quarterly

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POSTSCRIPT

MOURNERS SEIZE COFFIN

NZPA Lima.

Chanting mourners wrested the coffin of former Peruvian President General Juan Velasco Alvarado from its hearse and carried it on their shoulders nearly five kilometers in a procession joined by 200,000 people.

Velasco, who died on Saturday at the age of 67, was buried in the Angel cemetery near the presidential palace, where he ran Peru with a firm hand from 1968 until a military coup ousted him in 1975.

A day of national mourning was declared by General Francisco Morales Bermudez, the man who replaced Velasco as president. He did not attend the funeral but the commanding generals of the three armed forces were among those who did.

When the coffin was brought from the cathedral where services were held, the crowd gathered outside broke into applause and chants of 'Long live Velasco'.

Taranaki Daily News
28 December 1977